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ABSTRACT 
 
“THEY GOING TO THROW YOU IN JACKSON WHERE YOU BELONG”: 
DEPICTIONS OF MENTAL DISABILITY IN THE WORKS OF 
WILLIAM FAULKNER AND FLANNERY O’CONNOR 
 
by Marie E. Lawson 
 
 Mentally disabled characters in the works of William Faulkner and Flannery 
O’Connor are often subjected to mistreatment, neglect, and violence at the hands of their 
families and communities.  In William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (1929) and 
The Hamlet (1940) and Flannery O’Connor’s “The Life You Save May Be Your Own” 
(1955) and The Violent Bear it Away (1960), characters with mental disabilities are 
depicted in such a way as to evoke sympathy for the characters without the narratives 
overtly calling for sympathy.  This is achieved through the juxtaposition of positive 
narrative portrayals with negative treatment by the characters’ families, and the violence 
these characters endure is the extreme but necessary final step in creating sympathy for 
them.  
v 
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Introduction 
In The Novels of William Faulkner (1964), Olga Vickery examines a scene in 
William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (1929) where Benjy Compson, who is 
mentally disabled, accompanies the family servant Dilsey to Easter Sunday church 
services.  The ruckus this incites in the community is twofold; both Benjy’s mental 
disability and the blurred lines of racial segregation become a point of contention for the 
town.  Vickery observes, “the whites regard [Benjy] as a problem: since he is obviously 
white, they frown on his attendance at a Negro church, but since he is obviously an idiot, 
they are unwilling to receive him into theirs.  Somehow in the process, the additional fact 
that he is a human being is forgotten by all except Dilsey” (47).  This scene, and 
Vickery’s interpretation of it, exemplifies the issues characters with mental disabilities 
face in the works of both William Faulkner and Flannery O’Connor.  These characters 
are alienated and neglected by their families and communities, and while such treatment 
dehumanizes them, it also proves to be a strong way for the narrative to secure sympathy 
for these mentally disabled characters. 
 William Faulkner and Flannery O’Connor share an interest in the plight of the 
mentally challenged.  This thesis examines the ways in which characters who are 
mentally disabled are depicted, and how sympathy for their marginalized and victimized 
status is achieved.  Characters with other disabilities are not considered here, such as 
Faulkner’s Darl (As I Lay Dying, 1930), who exhibits mental illness but is still able to 
interact with his family; or O’Connor’s Hulga/Joy (“Good Country People,” 1955), who 
is physically disabled.  There is a distinction between characters with mental disability 
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and characters who exhibit other forms of disability, even mental illness, in that the 
characters who are mentally disabled are depicted as unable to speak and are thus unable 
to successfully interact with the families and communities that do not have the patience 
or interest to work to understand them. 
Faulkner and O’Connor depict characters with mental disabilities who are 
neglected, mistreated, and abandoned by those around them.  Faulkner’s Benjy Compson 
(The Sound and the Fury, 1929) and Ike Snopes (The Hamlet, 1940), as well as 
O’Connor’s Lucynell Crater (“The Life You Save May Be Your Own,” 1955) and Bishop 
(The Violent Bear it Away, 1960) stand apart from other special needs characters in these 
authors’ works because they are mentally disabled, and the degree of their disability 
leaves them unable to understand the mistreatment and manipulation they receive from 
their family and neighbors.  These characters’ inability to speak drastically limits their 
capacity to defend themselves or make their needs known.   
While these characters are often critically dismissed as explorations of the 
grotesque (as is the case for O’Connor’s characters) or as stylistic experimentation (as is 
often the case for Faulkner’s characters), the narratives themselves actively encourage a 
closer look.  Each of the four characters is presented not only as a sympathetic character 
(which is rare in O’Connor’s works) but also as capable of growth, compassion, and 
profound emotion.  The narratives display the positive attributes of these characters, and 
yet many of those around them view them as little more than empty, mindless, usable 
shells.  The marked difference between how the narrative portrays the characters and how 
their kin/community perceives them establishes sympathy in the reader, as does the 
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dichotomy of portrayal and perception, combined with narratives of lifelong neglect and 
acts of extreme violence.  Thus the narratives create sympathy for these mentally disabled 
characters by establishing the ignorance of many of those around them, and then through 
unwarranted abuse, the narratives call for greater understanding and defense of those with 
special needs. 
O’Connor critics have often viewed disability in O’Connor’s works as largely 
connected to a spiritual message.  In “The Parabolic in Faulkner, O’Connor, and Percy” 
(1983), Sallie McFague argues that the depiction of disability is essential to O’Connor 
because “mechanized, rationalistic society makes it extremely difficult to see beneath the 
surface of things to the essentials, to reality.  Thus, distortion, caricature, the grotesque – 
her ‘freaks’ – are necessary to create the possibility of true vision” (55).  O’Connor’s 
purported authorial goals are most often recognized as spiritual rather than humanistic, so 
her characters, including those with disabilities, serve a spiritual purpose.  Thelma J. 
Shinn, in “Flannery O’Connor and the Violence of Grace” (1968), notes an “inverted 
grotesqueness” in O’Connor’s works, where the presence of physical disability 
accompanies spiritual health: “In most of these characters, their physical afflictions serve 
to protect them from a spiritual affliction” (61).  This is not always the case, however; for 
example, in The Violent Bear it Away, Rayber’s deafness can be viewed as a spiritual 
punishment in that the injury causing his hearing loss issued from Mason’s gun, and the 
hearing aide he uses gives him a robotic, non-human quality.  There seems to be no 
exception to Shinn’s statement that “The idiots are protected from the corrupting 
influences of the modern world simply because they cannot reach them; they remain in 
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the innocent realm of childhood” (61).  For better or worse, Lucynell and Bishop are 
largely portrayed as childlike and innocent. 
Both Lucynell and Bishop are linked to O’Connor’s religious themes.  When 
Lucynell falls asleep at the diner where Shiftlet abandons her, the waiter comments that 
she looks like an “angel of Gawd” (154), which directly links her to spiritual themes.  
Bishop is often explored in terms of his significance to Tarwater’s prophetic journey; 
Mason, Tarwater’s great uncle, has enjoined Tarwater to baptize Bishop, and because 
Tarwater feels this calling is beneath him, the resentment and defiance Tarwater 
experiences shape his actions throughout the novel.  In The Incarnational Art of Flannery 
O’Connor (2005), Christina Bieber Lake explores how Bishop’s disability makes him the 
perfect Christ-like figure for conveying O’Connor’s beliefs in Catholicism.  Lake 
contends that O’Connor “gives a complex and living incarnation of the beautiful: the 
retarded child Bishop” (142).  Bishop’s spiritual significance is twofold; first, Lake notes, 
“Although criticism has tended to minimize Bishop’s importance in the novel by treating 
Tarwater’s call as merely the vestiges of the old man’s vision, O’Connor’s prose 
illustrates the clear centrality of [Bishop] as one that represents the divine mystery with 
which Tarwater will have to come to terms before he can begin his ministry” (147).  
Additionally, Rayber encourages Tarwater to look at Bishop and he initially refuses; 
Lake argues that “part of what Tarwater must recognize is that his calling is of the highest 
because it is of the lowest.  This struggle to see Bishop correctly explains why Bishop 
operates as a kind of Christ figure.  He is the lowliest of the low, and it is shocking that 
God would value him, as shocking as the fact that God would incarnate himself as a 
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human baby” (158).  Thus, Bishop’s disability serves a thematic role in the novel’s plot, 
and most critics are satisfied to leave him in a role that is so blatantly the beginning and 
end of the author’s intention.  O’Connor’s intense religious beliefs continue to dominate 
literary critical attention, while the products of her artistic imagination (like Lucynell and 
Bishop) are reduced to markers pinpointing O’Connor’s particular spiritual ideals.   
Faulkner’s characters with mental disabilities have also undergone their fair share 
of critical examination, but while Ike’s and Benjy’s mental disability have been noted, 
the subject has by no means been exhausted.  Ike’s relationship with the cow is the main 
focus of almost all critical mention of him and his mental disability blurs the lines 
between bestiality and innocent romance.  Lance Langdon, in “Commodifying Freedom: 
Horses in The Hamlet” (2012), reads the scene of bestiality as a reflection of “farmer’s 
autochthony,” where “Ike weds himself to the land through the cow, and the men in 
watching him do so enact in fantasy that same wedding that governs their working lives” 
(40).  The men therefore are drawn to Ike’s romance because they too are romanced not 
by the cow herself, but by a more primal connection to the land, to work the land and see 
it produce.  While this lends a somewhat positive reading to the men’s voyeurism, it does 
not account for the fact that the publicity of Ike’s relationship with his cow is the very 
thing that gets her butchered.  In fact, rather than connecting Ike to the men through a 
primal allure to the land, the peep show drastically separates Ike from the rest of the 
community as their voyeurism places him in a grotesque barnyard show that he does not 
realize he is participating in.  He is an other, so interesting to the men because they 
cannot relate to him.  The very marked difference in narrative tone between Ike’s 
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experience in the hamlet and outside of it both supports and encourages this reading, and 
while some readers conceive this section as a satire on romance or as a grotesque 
comedy, the narrative simply does not support such a view.   
Benjy’s mental disability also attracts ample critical attention, but the result is 
often an exploration of how his simplistic mind conveys chronology and a powerful sense 
of loss, to name the two largest scholastic interests.  These are important themes because, 
while they often focus on the symbology of time and loss, they also explore what each 
issue means to Benjy specifically, and thus bolster his importance as a character.  
Marjorie Pryse goes to extensive lengths to actually graph out Benjy’s temporal journey 
in “Textual Duration Against Chronological Time: Graphing Memory in Faulkner’s 
Benjy Section” (2009).  Responding to a long-standing critical fascination with how 
Benjy’s consciousness flows, jerks, or otherwise moves through memories, Pryse views 
Benjy’s narrative as “what consciousness would look like if we could separate memories 
from past experience” (17).  Pryse summarizes a commonly-held critical assumption that, 
“Since for Benjy, the present serves only as stimulus out of and again back into particular 
moments from the past, Faulkner encourages the reader to look directly at what loss 
would feel like if it were immediately accessible to us” (21).  Thus Benjy’s mental 
disability allows the narrative to explore this theme without overcomplicating it with 
complex emotions or language.  Benjy’s severe mental disability, then, gives him 
considerable narrative value.     
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  While the way Benjy presents his narrative is shaped by his disability, much of 
the tragedy he recounts in his narrative results from others treating him in a subhuman 
way because of his disability.  While Benjy’s mental disability is important to how he 
recounts his experiences, the ways in which his disability affects his experiences are often 
overlooked.  Maria Truchan-Tataryn marks one exception to this trend as she investigates 
disability within literature in “Textual Abuse: Faulkner’s Benjy” (2005).  Truchan-
Tataryn notes that “There is overwhelming consensus … acknowledging Faulkner’s 
success in portraying the consciousness of an ‘idiot’ in the character of Benjy Compson” 
(159).  She argues that “unquestioning acceptance of [Benjy] as a successful 
representation of intellectual disability reveals an underlying ableism in the literary 
critical endeavor and an academic acquiescence to dated socio-cultural constructions of 
disability” (160).  Thus, if Faulkner critics agree that he has captured the interiority of a 
mentally disabled person in the blank, infantile, and sub-human Benjy Compson, such a 
reception damages (or perpetuates damage already done to) the real social plight of 
people with mental disability.  Truchan-Tataryn summarizes:  
While Faulkner’s exploration of idiocy can be understood, if not 
condoned, by his historical context, his work has authorized a legacy of 
writing that sustains, with few exceptions, the idiot myth.  For critics, 
Faulkner’s rendering of human blankness has typified individuals 
medically labeled as idiots.  Benjy, however, more accurately illuminates 
not the (lack of) subjectivity of a cognitively impaired individual in lived 
experience but rather imaginings projected upon a population denied 
agency and voice by authors of public policy as well as narrative texts.  
(163)   
 
Truchan-Tataryn’s most universally applicable statement is that “Inhuman treatment is 
justified by subhuman status and evidence of cognition is subsumed by a self-authorized 
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judgment of mindlessness” (167).  Each character examined here lives in a community 
that has deemed them mindless and therefore subhuman and acts neglectfully or 
abusively as a result.  
Disability Studies within literature, of course, is a much larger body of work than 
what is evident in the critiques of Faulkner and O’Connor.  In “From Virginia’s Sister to 
Friday’s Silence: Presence, Metaphor, and the Persistence of Disability in Contemporary 
Writing,” (2012), Stuart Murray assesses the literary trend that places “characters with 
disabilities at the margin of a text,” where they “only exist to make the plot turn in a 
certain direction or to underscore an ableist narrative in which a non-disabled character 
comes to know himself better through an interaction with disability” (249).  While both 
Faulkner’s and O’Connor’s narratives directly engage with this pattern, they also 
undercut it.  For O’Connor’s disabled characters, the narratives surrounding them all but 
promise to comply with Murray’s observations, where they at first seem to situate the 
nondisabled characters so that they will learn some life lesson from the disabled 
characters they encounter.  For example, in “The Life You Save May Be Your Own,” 
Tom Shiftlet needs to use Lucynell in order to get to the real prize (the car).  Perhaps in 
any other author’s hands he may have learned something about sympathy and become a 
better person for his close contact with the mentally disabled Lucynell, but in this story 
he makes no such changes and much of the unfinished atmosphere at the end of the story 
results from the unsatisfied anticipation of such an outcome.  
Murray also notes a “long tradition of disability novels in which a genocidal 
impulse toward those with disabilities is all too clear” (248).  The indication here is that 
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disability interferes with a neatly ordered world, and thus cannot be present in a neatly 
ordered ending.  If harmony is to be restored at the end of a story, disability must be 
erased.  O’Connor engages with the tradition of killing off characters with disabilities by 
the end of the narrative, and again dismantles such readings.  While Lucynell is still alive 
at the end of her story, she is abandoned and alone fifty miles from home with no 
imaginable way to get back.  When the story continues on without her, leaving her behind 
as Shiftlet drives away and literally leaves her behind, she is basically dead to the 
plotline.   
That is not to say that O’Connor is using her works to argue for greater rights for 
the disabled.  In fact, her own comments on her works ascribe to her characters, 
especially to Bishop, the role of a spiritual guide, where the other characters’ refusal to 
change after contact with them speaks to their own religious struggles.  Lake quotes 
O’Connor as saying Bishop is to be “a kind of Christ image, though a better way to think 
of it is probably just as a kind of redemptive figure” (167).  Indeed, O’Connor does not 
profess to extend an agenda of disability rights, but there is the unmistakable tendency for 
these narratives to paint mentally disabled characters, specifically, as innocent, 
uncorrupted and trusting, which contrasts starkly with a world of able-bodied and 
physically disabled characters within her works who are scheming, selfish and naive.  
Lucynell and Bishop are subject to the same violence and neglect as the rest of the 
inhabitants in O’Connor’s fiction, but they are unique in that the narrative itself suggests 
they do not merit such mistreatment.  
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Faulkner engages with stereotypical plotlines of disability by confounding their 
central tenet – that if a disabled character is of secondary importance to a nondisabled 
character, existing only to enhance the narrative of the nondisabled character, then by 
virtue of their secondary status they are less complex, less interesting, essentially less 
worthy of consideration.  Faulkner directly refutes this not only by portraying disabled 
characters who arguably exist largely outside the considerations of their nondisabled 
counterparts (each member of the Compson family is so absorbed by their own drama by 
1928 that Benjy must spend his days with Dilsey’s family and not his own, while Ike 
barely appears in the narratives of his kin), but also by allotting both Ike and Benjy 
considerable, dedicated narrative attention.  Each character is allowed to be just that – a 
character – rather than a supporting role on the outskirts of the narrative, and thus 
Faulkner gives dignity to his disabled characters.   
Faulkner, like O’Connor, complicates interpretations of his works by commenting 
on them.  His remarks about Benjy in particular become problematic, especially when he 
states, “The only emotion I can have for Benjy is grief and pity for all mankind.  You 
can’t feel anything for Benjy because he doesn’t feel anything” (qtd in Roggenbuck, 
584).  This assertion of emotional emptiness is just one aspect of Benjy’s character that 
the narrative expressly refutes, as this thesis will explore.  Thus the narratives’ 
presentations of these characters are my main concern here.  Faulkner’s notoriously 
unreliable comments on his works, coupled with Robert McGill’s observations in “The 
Life You Write May Be Your Own: Epistolary Autobiography and the Reluctant 
Resurrection of Flannery O’Connor” (2004) that “in letters and essays [O’Connor] 
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frequently follows New Critical thinking by asserting that her life and intentions should 
be extrinsic to readings of her texts, and in her early career she was reticent to provide 
interpretations of her stories” (33), allows for a close examination of these author’s works 
without relying on their own professed (and problematic) authorial intentions.  
Essentially, this thesis strives to reclaim Lucynell, Bishop, Benjy, and Ike, and to 
examine their individual identities in the face of their social, critical, and even authorial 
strictures.  
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Chapter 1 
O’Connor’s Unjustly Victimized Victims 
“The Life You Save May Be Your Own” 
Flannery O’Connor’s “The Life You Save May Be Your Own” follows the arrival 
of a one-armed conman, Tom T. Shiftlet, on a farm owned by the aging Mrs. Crater and 
her deaf and mentally disabled daughter, Lucynell.  The unscrupulous Shiftlet works on 
the farm and gains the mother’s trust with the aim of obtaining possession of the family’s 
car.  Mrs. Crater is blinded by her desire to have help around the farm, so she offers her 
daughter’s hand in marriage to tie Shiftlet to the family.  Shiftlet complies and marries 
Lucynell, but once he has the car, Shiftlet abandons Lucynell on their honeymoon trip at 
a roadside diner one hundred miles from the farm.   
These two disabled characters are not depicted in revolutionary ways: the 
narrative implies that Lucynell’s mental disability protects her from engaging in the evils 
of the world around her, thus securing her innocence.  She does, however, fall victim to 
such evils because she cannot care for herself, and no one else is caring for her.  Shiftlet’s 
disabled body, thanks to popular literary tropes, immediately suggests that he is damaged 
morally or spiritually.  What is remarkable in O’Connor’s works is the way in which the 
narrative secures sympathy for Lucynell.  This sympathy is generated not by her pitiable 
and mindless condition, as those around her perceive, but rather because she is 
manipulated by the very people who are supposed to care for her wellbeing.  Mrs. Crater 
and Shiftlet devalue Lucynell, but this actually enforces her worth within the narrative.  
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She is objectified and ignored by her mother and Shiftlet, but her character continually 
asserts both her presence and humanity.   
Although Lucynell is disabled, she does not adhere to literary traditions of 
disability.  While the short story seems to duplicate the pattern Murray describes, where 
“yet another character with disabilities [is] at the margin of a text, [and] only exists to 
make the plot turn in a certain direction and to underscore an ableist narrative in which a 
non-disabled character comes to know himself better through an interaction with 
disability” (249), in fact Lucynell is at the center of the narrative.  The short story further 
confounds this trope because it initially seems to be headed toward Shiftlet’s salvation 
through his relationship with Lucynell, but this does not happen.  Lucynell does not 
change Shiftlet’s perspective, and her disability does not necessarily facilitate her 
abandonment at the diner; a character without mental disabilities could have been just as 
easily abandoned if he/she had fallen asleep.  Lucynell is, however, the victim in this 
narrative, a condition which adheres to generic depictions of disability while 
simultaneously providing a foundation for reader’s sympathy. 
Lucynell is depicted in varying ways.  She is helpless, observant, developing; 
significantly, she is not a flat or static figure.  At the beginning of the story, “the daughter 
was leaning very far down, hanging her head almost between her knees watching [Mr. 
Shiftlet] through a triangular door she had made in her overturned hair; and she suddenly 
fell in a heap on the floor and began to whimper.  Mr. Shiftlet straightened her out and 
helped her get back in her chair” (149).  The narrator, in a depiction of her posture, 
includes the helplessness of her limbs, describing Lucynell with “her head thrust forward 
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and her fat helpless hands hanging at the wrists” (146).  The specificity of the description 
evokes conflicting interpretations; on the one hand, Lucynell’s hands are helpless, but not 
Lucynell herself.  Her body might be limited in some ways, but by pointing to her hands 
only as being helpless, the words suggest Lucynell herself is not.  The other side of this 
image, however, is that Lucynell is in fact so helpless that even her limbs can be 
described in such terms.   
In these moments, Lucynell is a sympathetic figure, a young woman who can 
barely care for herself.  While it is tempting to view these scenes as demeaning – 
Lucynell is not, after all, a powerful and independent figure – they in fact humanize her.  
Such characterizations may be extreme but they indeed mirror real life possibilities.  The 
narrator does not use empowering or euphemistic language when describing Lucynell; 
the narrator simply recounts what Lucynell does, from falling off her chair to learning to 
say “bird.”  This separation between narrator and character represents the arms-length at 
which most of society holds Lucynell and others like her.  There may not be implicit 
judgment but neither is there an attempt at understanding.   
The narrative’s most blatant critique of this social detachment comes into play at 
Shiftlet’s introduction: “His left coat sleeve was folded up to show there was only half an 
arm in it and his gaunt figure listed slightly to the side as if the breeze were pushing him” 
(145).  Shiftlet comes onto the farm, armless, leaning to one side, but fully lucid.  
Lucynell, on the other hand, “a large girl in a short blue organdy dress, saw him all at 
once and jumped up and began to stamp and point and make excited speechless sounds.  
Mr. Shiftlet stopped just inside the yard and set his box on the ground and tipped his hat 
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at her as if she were not in the least afflicted” (145).  Shiftlet has a host of physical 
disabilities – Lucynell’s mother labels him as a “poor disabled friendless drifting man” 
(152) – and yet the narrator names only Lucynell as “afflicted.”  This blunt and 
demeaning moment in the narrative foreshadows the brutal treatment Lucynell receives 
from Shiftlet when he abandons her.   
This moment also juxtaposes Shiftlet’s greeting, which avoids Lucynell’s 
disability, with the immediate narrative commentary that points out her disability, 
emphasizing society’s devaluation of those who are mentally disabled.  Alison Arant, in 
“‘A Moral Intelligence’: Mental Disability and Eugenic Resistance in Welty’s ‘Lily Daw 
and the Three Ladies’ and O’Connor’s ‘The Life You Save May Be Your Own’” (2012), 
evaluates the short story by examining its relationship to contemporary eugenic rhetoric, 
claiming “the context of the marriage of a woman with mental disabilities [to a man 
without mental disabilities] … generated anxiety in a national eugenic discourse” (80).  
The fear was that mental disability was genetic and inheritable, and that if people with 
mental disabilities married (and subsequently had children) mental disability would 
become more widespread.  Arant notes that, in “The Life You Save May Be Your Own,” 
“the concept of the mentally disabled woman as threat and victim is at play,” but 
Lucynell does not pose a threat to communal morality because “Lucynell’s disability 
precludes the existence of any community whatsoever” (80).  Lucynell’s disability, 
particularly in her muteness, does indeed interfere with her ability to join the larger 
community around her, and she is not so much involved in her immediate community 
(i.e. her mother and Mr. Shiftlet) as she is used by it.  Her victimization, however, is 
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much more profound than her threatening reproductive possibilities because when she is 
abandoned at the diner at the end of the story, there is no sense of relief, no sense that a 
societal danger has been avoided.  Rather the scene produces both shock and sympathy 
for the newly made victim.   
Shiftlet’s introduction provides a focused moment of narrative critique on eugenic 
ideology, where Arant notes “Shiftlet rejects definitions of fitness that assume a link 
between physical and moral traits, a standard that both he and [Lucynell] fail to meet” 
(82).  Arant observes that “O’Connor connects the Craters’ lack of a man in the 
household to immobility and deterioration, and Shiftlet presents the solution to both 
problems” (80); his “willingness to overlook Lucynell’s disabilities and his keen interest 
in the car initially situate him as the solution to the Craters’ problems” (80).  Shiftlet’s 
avoidance of Lucynell’s disability is problematic, however.  After all, would Shiftlet’s 
greeting change if he did acknowledge her disability?  Should Shiftlet tip his hat 
differently, or not at all, since Lucynell is disabled?  The term “afflicted” implies limits, 
both to Lucynell’s abilities and to her importance to the story since, from its very 
introduction, Shiftlet appears to ignore her disabilities.  Shiftlet’s manners contrast with 
Lucynell’s frantic actions, but this twists in on itself when Shiftlet’s manners are 
abandoned as he savagely abandons Lucynell, and the marginalized woman comes to 
dominate the reader’s attention.  Lucynell’s behavior reveals her limited cognition but 
Shiftlet’s behavior reveals disturbing and dangerous emotional limitations.  Shiftlet’s 
socially valued manners are but a smokescreen, while Lucynell is unaware of social 
decorum and thus lacks any manipulation.   
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While Lucynell’s jumping and stamping paints a vivid picture of a woman with 
cognitive disabilities, Gary M. Ciuba explores the narrative through the framework of 
Lucynell’s deafness.  Lucynell’s disability seems to shape the way her mother and 
Shiftlet treat her more than her deafness does, however, because it curtails her 
understanding of the transactions going on around (and about) her; Lucynell’s deafness 
is, nonetheless, a crucial aspect of her disability.  In “‘To the Hard of Hearing You 
Shout’: Flannery O’Connor and the Imagination of Deafness” (2012), Ciuba argues that 
“Lucynell is primarily shown.  Whereas Shiftlet and Mrs. Crater ignore and exclude the 
deaf woman as if she were invisible, the narrator records how Lucynell is insistently 
there.  Indeed, Lucynell makes a show of herself.  She moves around, gestures, and cries 
out, as if announcing and reasserting her deaf presence” (6).  I would argue that her 
presence in general, deaf and mentally disabled and all the other facets that make up 
Lucynell Crater, is constantly bombarding the narrative so that the reader cannot forget 
about her as her mother and Shiftlet do.  It is this insistence to be heard and marked, and 
the narrative compliance with such a desire, that prove Mrs. Crater’s and Shiftlet’s 
treatment of her as static and marginal to be both erroneous and damaging.  Ciuba 
observes, “Shiftlet and Mrs. Crater miss the significance of Lucynell because they 
converse about her, but they do not converse with her.  As the pair slyly conduct their 
marriage negotiations, Lucynell’s vocalizations and gesticulations are just so much noise 
that must be ignored to complete their transaction” (8).  Lucynell is making noise – the 
narrative is listening, but Mrs. Crater and Shiftlet are not.  
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The blunt and matter-of-fact nature with which the narrator describes Lucynell’s 
actions makes her vividly real and particularly vulnerable.  Lucynell’s mannerisms are 
often crude, like when she stamps and wags her finger as Shiftlet lights a cigarette (147), 
and she also exhibits detachment when she looks through her mother at their parting and 
carelessly picks the faux cherries off her hat while driving with Shiftlet (154-5).  This 
contrasts with the times when her attentions reveal an observant, though hidden, 
interiority.  From their first meeting, Lucynell is immediately absorbed with Shiftlet: “the 
daughter sat down too and watched him with a cautious sly look as if he were a bird that 
had come up very close.  He … brought out a package of chewing gum and offered her a 
piece.  She took it and unpeeled it and began to chew without taking her eyes off him” 
(146).  Lucynell’s attentiveness does not waver as Shiftlet’s stay lengthens.  As her 
mother proposes marriage between Lucynell and Shiftlet, Lucynell is “sitting on the floor 
a foot away, watching him, her eyes blue even in the dark” (151).  Lucynell’s active 
interiority is made apparent in the brief description of her while they are driving home 
from the wedding ceremony: “Every now and then her placid expression was changed by 
a sly isolated little thought like a shoot of green in the desert” (153).  Neither these 
thoughts nor their nature is expounded upon, but this description shows her inner self to 
be awake and active.  This description is crucial because it grants Lucynell an agency and 
an interiority that distinguishes her moments of helplessness.   
Lucynell is not an object, as her mother and Shiftlet consider her to be, but rather 
a character in her own right.  One of the most important facets of Lucynell’s character is 
her seeming mental growth, however slight that might be.  When she learns to say “bird,” 
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the first word she has spoken in her life, she is proving herself to be anything but static.  
Her fascination with Mr. Shiftlet and his reciprocated attention benefits Lucynell: Mr. 
Shiftlet “taught Lucynell, who was completely deaf and had never said a word in her life, 
to say the word ‘bird.’   The big rosy-faced girl followed him everywhere, saying 
‘Burrttddt ddbirrrttdt,’ and clapping her hands” (150).  This moment of learning is crucial 
because not only is Lucynell capable of development, but she has never learned to speak 
living with her mother.  Either her mother thought her incapable of speech and never 
sought to teach her, or Lucynell is somehow blossoming under the greater attention of a 
larger community that Shiftlet represents.  Her ability to learn and say a word for the first 
time shows that Lucynell is capable of growth.  This movement pushes against other 
instances of helplessness to create a woman who is much more dynamic than either her 
mother or Shiftlet give her allowance for.  
These observations find their proof in the narrative voice.  The objective narrator 
presents Lucynell as she is, neither coloring her as a victim to be pitied nor a champion 
who cannot be overcome.  Lucynell is victimized by her mother and Shiftlet rather than 
by the narrative itself.  Lucynell is vulnerable, but she is also sharp – her ability to learn a 
word at thirty years old and completely deaf demonstrates the possibility for mental 
growth.  This objective narrative voice stands in sharp contrast to the voices of her 
mother and Shiftlet.  When Lucynell’s mother describes her as innocent, she is imposing 
a static image onto Lucynell so that Shiftlet will find her appealing: “‘You want you an 
innocent woman, don’t you?’ she asked sympathetically.  ‘You don’t want none of this 
trash.’  ‘No’m, I don’t,’ Mr. Shiftlet said.   ‘One that can’t talk,’ she continued, ‘can’t 
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sass you back or use foul language.  That’s the kind for you to have.  Right there’ and she 
pointed to Lucynell sitting cross-legged in her chair, holding both feet in her hands” 
(151).  Whether it be her deafness or her mental disability (or both) that separate her from 
language, Lucynell exists outside of this transaction.  Arant observes that “It is the 
mother’s attempt to neutralize Lucynell’s status as a social liability that effects the 
daughter’s transition from threat to victim” (81).  Lucynell’s disabilities position her as a 
threat in eugenic discourse, so Mrs. Crater transforms Lucynell’s specific conditions from 
eugenic hazards to marital fortune.  Mrs. Crater speaks of her daughter’s muteness as a 
blessing to a husband, overlooking the fact that is also limits Lucynell from expressing 
herself effectively to her husband.  
Mrs. Crater further limits her daughter when she praises Lucynell’s “smarts” by 
enumerating her skills on the farm – hardly the stuff of parental love: “[Lucynell is] the 
sweetest girl in the world.  I would give her up for nothing on earth.  She’s smart too.  
She can sweep the floor, cook, wash, feed the chickens, and hoe.  I wouldn’t give her up 
for a casket of jewels” (149).  These menial chores do not describe intelligence, but they 
do objectify and demean Lucynell.  Mrs. Crater describes her daughter as sweet, but then 
proceeds to describe all the chores a farm hand performs.  Mrs. Crater places more value 
on Lucynell’s usefulness than her personality.  
Mrs. Crater’s final shortchanging of her daughter proves to be Lucynell’s 
downfall.  Lucynell’s mother is hungry for a son-in-law at the expense of her daughter, 
and this selfishness paves the way for Lucynell to be abandoned at a diner, miles from 
home.  Arant notes, “The fulfillment of the mother’s wish for a son-in-law is improbable 
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because of her daughter’s inabilities to reason, speak, see clearly, or even balance herself 
… [which] frame the daughter as a liability” (81).  Lucynell’s mother is relentless in 
forcing the idea of marriage onto Shiftlet.  She approaches the subject often – after 
Lucynell learns to say “bird,” Mrs. Crater pushes the subject with Shiftlet: “‘Teach her to 
say something else,’ the old woman said.  ‘What you want her to say next?’ Mr. Shiftlet 
asked.  The old woman’s smile was broad and toothless and suggestive.  ‘Teach her to 
say ‘sugarpie’,’ she said” (150).  Ciuba views this as “Mrs. Crater [hoping] to recondition 
Lucynell further through speech” (7).  Her repeated, and finally successful, attempts at 
getting Mr. Shiftlet to marry her daughter show that Mrs. Crater is blind to Lucynell’s 
wellbeing.  At best, she may be thinking of her daughter’s security once she is gone, or 
she may be concerned with having more people around for Lucynell to interact with 
socially.  Or she may be desirous of her own comfort and security as old age approaches 
– but none of this masks the fact that she is uniting her daughter with a stranger and 
opening a world of sexual and patriarchal rules and expectations that are not only new 
and foreign to Lucynell, but are potentially damaging as well.  Ciuba suggests that 
Lucynell is “cheerfully carnal,” “delighted to have a sweetheart” and has “an erotic 
energy that keeps her from being purely ethereal” (8), but this does not mean that she is 
ready for the experiences that come with matrimony.  
 Lucynell’s silence is inseparable from the moment of her abandonment, when 
both Shiftlet and the narrative leave her at the diner and do not look back.  Lucynell is 
asleep when she is abandoned a hundred miles from home, and it takes no stretch of the 
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imagination to presume that when she wakes, she will have little or no way to 
communicate to those around her where she is from or how to get her home:  
He had driven about a hundred miles when … he stopped in front of an 
aluminum-painted eating place called The Hot Spot and took her in and 
ordered her a plate of ham and grits.  The ride had made her sleepy and as 
soon as she got up on the stool, she rested her head on the counter and shut 
her eyes.  Before he could dish up the food, she was snoring gently.  “Give 
it to her when she wakes up,” Mr. Shiftlet said.  “I’ll pay for it now.”  The 
boy bent over her and stared at the long pink-gold hair and the half-shut 
sleeping eyes.  Then he looked up and started at Mr. Shiftlet.  “She looks 
like an angel of Gawd,” he murmured.  “Hitchhiker,” Mr. Shiftlet 
explained.  “I can’t wait.  I got to make Tuscaloosa.”  The boy bent over 
again and very carefully touched his finger to a strand of the golden hair 
and Mr. Shiftlet left.  (154-155) 
 
The chilling possibility here is that she never finds her way home and is institutionalized 
– she is presumed a hitchhiker and cannot say her own name – all for the sake of a car.  
Lucynell is also silenced in that her person, her future, and her safety mean nothing to 
Shiftlet.  Although his only concern is taking the car and the money he was given, 
Shiftlet’s abandonment of Lucynell has the potential to be life-shattering for her.  She is a 
silent figure to him, a wisp of a presence that does not elicit a thought from him once he 
has left her.  When Shiftlet leaves the diner, Lucynell is erased from the narrative as 
completely as if she had never been there – Shiftlet moves on to his own thoughts and 
troubles and Lucynell’s involvement in the story is effectively over.  While Ciuba 
suggests that “Although the deaf Lucynell gets left behind, she lingers as an unspoken 
presence” (9) for the reader, she is gone from Shiftlet’s thoughts.  Indeed, Shiftlet’s 
spirits drop, he picks up a hitchhiker for the conversation and the company, and 
reminisces about his mother (who, in a psychological reading I will not attempt here, is 
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probably the foundation for Shiftlet’s actions, therefore making the mother the unspoken 
presence, not the briefly known and recently abandoned wife).   
 While Lucynell is excluded from her mother’s and Shiftlet’s world since she can 
neither hear the plans her mother and Shiftlet make for her nor understand them, the 
narrative refuses to discount Lucynell as her family does.  It is vital to separate the way 
the narrative attentively represents Lucynell from the way her mother and Shiftlet 
objectify her, because it is this dichotomy itself that shows Lucynell deserves better than 
she gets.  The narrative does not overtly create sympathy for Lucynell, but rather depicts 
disgusting qualities in Mrs. Crater and Shiftlet that Lucynell cannot participate in.  At the 
same time, Lucynell is depicted as innocent by the same narrative that records Mrs. 
Crater’s toothless, suggestive smile (150) and a depressed Shiftlet’s claim that Lucynell 
is just a hitchhiker (155).  Mrs. Crater and Shiftlet continually act through selfishness and 
deceit, and the narrative is clear as to the outcome: Mrs. Crater is robbed of the car, the 
son-in-law she is desperate for, and the helpful daughter she had, while Shiftlet’s spirits 
sink even after he gains the car with no strings attached.  These characters are punished 
for objectifying Lucynell, while Lucynell’s fate is not punishment but rather the 
destruction that comes when those who cannot defend themselves are left without 
defenders.  Lucynell’s behaviors may be crude and infantile, but she lacks all the 
deception and self-interest that her mother and Shiftlet continually display.  It is 
impossible to be sympathetic to Mrs. Crater’s or Shiftlet’s plight, while Lucynell garners 
sympathy from the reader that the narrative utilizes when she is abandoned.  The story 
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may continue to follow Shiftlet, but the reader’s thoughts are left back at the diner, on the 
counter with the sleeping Lucynell.  
The Violent Bear it Away 
Lucynell is used and discarded by Shiftlet and her fate remains an ominous 
unknown at the end of her story.  Bishop is also used and discarded, but his fate is no 
mystery.  O’Connor’s The Violent Bear it Away (1960) takes to the extreme the violence 
and abandonment special needs characters face in these works.  In this novel, young 
Tarwater seeks out his rational-minded uncle Rayber after his guardian, the religious 
zealot Mason Tarwater, dies over breakfast.  Tarwater struggles not only to reject 
Mason’s demand that he be a prophet, but also to reject the anti-religious, scientific 
rationale that Rayber seeks to instill in him.  Rayber’s mentally disabled son Bishop is the 
tragic center of this struggle, since Mason assures young Tarwater that baptizing Bishop 
is his first prophetic task.  Tarwater drowns Bishop in an attempt to eliminate the child as 
a prophetic temptation, yet he speaks the baptismal rite as he drowns Bishop.  Tarwater 
continues to flee his calling until he is violated by a stranger, after which he finally 
accepts his calling and heads to the city to begin his life as a prophet.  
Tarwater is undoubtedly the central character in the novel, and Bishop is often 
treated critically as being important mainly in Tarwater’s story, as a vessel through which 
Tarwater struggles against his destiny.  Bishop’s death is often used as proof that Rayber, 
the aspiritual and scientifically minded man, is so fundamentally flawed that he feels no 
pain in the grips of his son’s murder.  While these conclusions offer sharp insights into 
both Tarwater’s and Rayber’s particular struggles, they position Bishop as more of a plot 
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point than a character.  Tarwater and Rayber take center stage, while the tragedies of 
Bishop’s short life and his resilience to them are dismissed, as is the role his disability 
plays within the novel.  
Bishop and Lucynell share many of the same struggles.  Like Lucynell, Bishop is 
unable to speak, and once again this proves to be a strong social limitation.  Bishop is 
incapable of verbally conveying his thoughts to those around him, which creates an 
impasse neither Rayber nor Tarwater attempt to bridge.  Bishop’s limitations, however, 
are not so much that he cannot speak, but that he is not being heard.  Bishop may not use 
words to communicate with his father or cousin, but he has a powerful way of conveying 
his most basic desires – he bellows, a primal form of communication.  Bishop bellows 
when he is pulled from the fountain, when the dancers stop dancing, when Tarwater is 
drowning him.  There is no mistaking this vocal communication – Bishop is unhappy and 
is, in a way, expressing his desire to live.  He wants to continue the enjoyment of the 
fountain, the pleasure of watching the dancers, and the right to be alive.  These cues are 
often ignored by a disciplinary father, an outraged group of dancers, and a selfish cousin, 
but these bellows are communication nonetheless.  Bishop’s tragedies are not so much 
the result of his inability to speak as they are of the inability of those around him to hear 
him when he does express himself.  Bishop, like Lucynell, is vocalizing, but once again 
no one is listening.   
Another similarity between Bishop and Lucynell is that Bishop is continually and 
pervasively present in the novel, making his presence known even when Tarwater 
doesn’t want him around.  Bishop is a “small pink-faced boy” with “white hair and a 
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knobby forehead” whose mouth is perpetually “hung in a silly smile” (31).  Tarwater’s 
first description of his cousin is heavy with reaction; he sees Bishop’s eyes as “grey like 
the old man’s but clear, as if the other side of them went down and down into two pools 
of light” (23).  The shock of seeing Bishop in person produces an honest assessment of 
Bishop’s eyes and the light he sees in them; only after Tarwater has had time to recover 
himself and refocus, he contorts his memory so that Bishop’s eyes are “clear and empty” 
(31).  Tarwater wants to strip Bishop of importance but it is only when he can manipulate 
his own thoughts that he is able to do so.   
In much the same way, Tarwater layers Bishop with intentions the boy cannot 
have.  Tarwater feels “If he turned his head the opposite way, there would be the dim-
witted boy, hanging onto the schoolteacher’s coat, watching him.  His mouth hung in a 
lopsided smile but there was a judging sternness about his forehead” (160).  There is no 
judgment in Bishop’s absorption with Tarwater, neither in his eyes nor his forehead, but 
Tarwater sees the expression of his guilty conscience over his treatment of his uncle 
Mason’s body in Bishop, his uncle’s look-alike.  Tarwater is unable to bury Mason’s 
body, and this decision haunts him even if he refuses to admit it.  Tarwater treats Bishop 
like a blank slate, ready to be inscribed with whatever Tarwater needs to exorcise, but 
Bishop’s personality is anything but blank and this creates a tension that lends force to 
the tragic nature of Tarwater’s actions.  As will be discussed, Tarwater kills Bishop not 
for anything that Bishop has done, but rather to serve his own warped and futile attempts 
to escape the destiny his uncle has laid out for him.  
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Bishop is a playful, curious and friendly child whose interest in the world around 
him is evident during a walk through the city, where Bishop “dragged backwards on 
[Rayber’s] hand, always attracted by something they had already passed.  Every block or 
so he would squat down to pick up a stick or a piece of trash and have to be pulled up and 
along” (107).  Bishop’s wonderment is not confined to the city, and the trip he and 
Rayber make to Powderhead shows most powerfully the engulfing amazement Bishop 
displays for the world around him.  Bishop “jumped out [of the car] and made for the 
blackberry bushes, attracted by the wasps that buzzed over them.  Rayber leapt out and 
grabbed him just before he reached for one.  Gingerly he picked the child a blackberry 
and handed it to him.  The little boy studied it and then, with his fallen smile, returned it 
to him as if they were performing a ceremony” (184).  Even wasps and blackberries are 
something magical to Bishop, though the magic is lost on those around him.  When they 
finally arrive at Powderhead, “Bishop could barely walk for gaping.  He lifted his face to 
stare open-mouthed above him as if he were in some vast overwhelming edifice.  His hat 
fell off and Rayber picked it up and clamped it on his head again and pulled him on.  
Somewhere below them out of the silence a bird sounded four crystal notes.  The child 
stopped, his breath held” (184).  While Rayber and Tarwater are haunted by Powderhead 
and populate it with their own traumas and demons, Bishop is enchanted by the beauty of 
the homestead.  For Bishop, Powderhead is new and amazing and has not been sullied by 
the convolutions Rayber and Tarwater fill the place with.  The almost constant 
description of Bishop’s smile and his positive and resilient attitude toward the world 
around him show Bishop to be indestructibly innocent.  It is only when Bishop is filtered 
28 
 
 
through Tarwater’s hatred and jealousy or Rayber’s incessant intolerance that he is 
described as anything less than radiant and precious.  
Bishop is fascinated with Tarwater, and this hovers somewhere between charming 
and, given his death at Tarwater’s hands, tragic.  At their first meeting, Bishop creeps 
ever closer to Tarwater, “not five feet from him and was coming every instant closer with 
his lop-sided smile” and is continuously “sticking out his hand to touch him” (92).  Upon 
Tarwater’s arrival, Rayber fears “Bishop would drive [Tarwater] away with all his 
friendliness.  He was always creeping up to touch him” (111).  Tarwater is not won over 
by Bishop’s attention, however innocent it may be, and yet Bishop’s antics at the park are 
endearing and show a child who is full of wonder:  
Water rushed out of the mouth of a stone lion’s head into a shallow pool 
below and as soon as the dim-witted boy saw the water, he gave a whoop 
and galloped off toward it, flapping his arms like something released from 
a cage.  Tarwater saw exactly where he was heading, knew exactly what 
he was going to do.  “Too late, goddamit,” the schoolteacher muttered, 
“he’s in.”  The child stood grinning in the pool lifting his feet slowly up 
and down as if he liked the feel of the wet seeping into his shoes.  (164) 
 
It is important to note that this event is filtered through Tarwater’s subconscious.  When 
Rayber recounts the same event, he sees that “Water rushed from the mouth of a stone 
lion’s head into a shallow pool and the little boy was flying toward it, his arms flailing 
like a windmill” (145); where Tarwater sees an animalistic dimwit released from a cage, 
Rayber sees an animated little boy even if he still cannot appreciate Bishop’s 
wonderment.  For Bishop, the simple act of standing in water, an attraction that will 
shape his fate, brings joy that neither Rayber nor Tarwater can grasp.  Bishop’s elation 
and appreciation of life is lost on his family, so they describe him as animalistic, infantile, 
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and dim-witted.  Bishop’s disability prevents him from fully grasping these reactions, 
however, so he retains his innocence and genuine responses to life.   
Bishop’s reactions are as intense as they are authentic.  When Tarwater frightens 
Bishop at their first meeting, Bishop’s fear elicits his father’s protection.  After Tarwater 
swats at Bishop, Bishop  
let out a bellow startlingly loud.  He clambered up his father’s leg, pulling 
himself up by the schoolteacher’s pajama coat until he was almost on his 
shoulder.  “All right, all right,” the schoolteacher said, “there, there, shut 
up, it’s all right, he didn’t mean to hit you,” and he righted the child on his 
back and tried to slide him off but the little boy hung on, thrusting his head 
against his father’s neck and never taking his eyes off Tarwater.  (92) 
 
Bishop’s reaction to Tarwater’s cruelty is to run to his father and to nestle his head 
against Rayber’s neck.  This highly visual and physical moment evokes an intimacy 
between father and son that in some way softens Rayber’s crass entreaties for Bishop to 
“shut up.”  Tarwater picks up on this intimacy when he interprets this connection as “a 
vision of the schoolteacher and his child as inseparably joined,” but he contorts this bond 
when he notices “The schoolteacher’s face was red and pained” and decides this must 
mean, to Rayber, that “The child might have been a deformed part of himself that had 
accidentally been revealed” (93).  Tarwater’s jealousy and dislike for Bishop cloud his 
judgment so that, at first, he can only view Bishop as an embarrassment and burden to his 
father.  
While Bishop has a unique personality, he also exhibits duality with Tarwater.  
O’Connor’s contemporary, Claire Rosenfield, in “The Shadow Within: The Conscious 
and Unconscious Use of the Double” (1963), attempts to identify moments of mirroring 
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or doubling in The Violent Bear it Away.  Rosenfield claims “duality inspires both terror 
and awe” (326) and notes “the novelist who consciously or unconsciously exploits 
psychological doubles may either juxtapose or duplicate two characters; the one 
representing the socially acceptable or conventional personality, the other externalizing 
the free, uninhibited, often criminal self” (328).  In tantalizing fashion, however, 
O’Connor’s characters cannot be split so easily into such dichotomies; Tarwater is not a 
conventional teenage boy, yet neither is he free and uninhibited.  He is, however, a 
criminal.  Bishop could also appear in both categories, since the woman at the lake is 
more accepting of Bishop than of Tarwater, of whom she is suspicious from the start, 
while the dancers who are so offended by Bishop’s attention offer a moment of social un-
acceptance.  Bishop is by no means criminal, but he absolutely represents a free and 
uninhibited self.  While the two may jostle about in their categories, they are both the 
same and the opposite of one another.   
Rosenfield follows the image of the devil on Tarwater’s shoulder, focusing her 
study on this embodiment of duality, but her observations are particularly insightful when 
applied to the mirroring between Tarwater and Bishop.  Rosenfield notes that Tarwater 
“does baptize the idiot child Bishop according to his uncle’s demand, but he drowns that 
child in the process, according to the command of his second self, ‘the stranger’” (338).  
While this observation is astute, it positions Bishop as little more than a stop along 
Tarwater’s twisted and tortured path to self, when in fact the mirroring between Tarwater 
and Bishop is crucial because Tarwater is not only aware of it on some level, but is also 
threatened by it.  Tarwater reacts to the doubling between himself and Bishop with just 
31 
 
 
the “terror and awe” Rosenfield mentions, and this fuels Tarwater’s behavior toward 
Bishop.  Tarwater sees Bishop’s mental disability as an insult in part because he sees 
himself in Bishop and is aware that Bishop’s life with Rayber was supposed to be his.  If 
Rayber had succeeded in taking him from Powderhead, he would have been raised in that 
house and he would be behind the opening door, not Bishop.  The mirroring Tarwater 
perceives in their situations makes Bishop’s mental disability all the more offensive to 
him.  
Tarwater is also linked to Bishop early on when Tarwater pretends to have a 
disability to avoid going to school.  When a truant officer comes to inquire about 
Tarwater’s absence from school, Tarwater adopts a disabled persona: Tarwater’s “eyes 
were open but not well-focused.  His head rolled uncontrollably on his slack shoulders 
and his tongue lolled in his open mouth” (18).  Upon seeing Tarwater, the officer 
immediately backs down from his mission.  Mason plays up the scenario as well:  
“He aint bright,” the old man said, “but he’s a mighty good boy.  He 
knows to come when you call him.”  “Yes,” the truant officer said, “well 
yes, but it might be best to leave him in peace.”  “I don’t know, he might 
take to schooling,” the old man said.  “He aint had a fit for going on two 
months.”  “I speck he better stay at home,” the officer said.  “I wouldn’t 
want to put a strain on him,” and he commenced to speak of other things.  
(18)     
 
While this episode is but a small vignette it establishes both the discomfort (though not 
outright negativity) the outside community has toward those with disabilities as well as 
Tarwater’s own ignorance of and insensitivity toward disability.  The truant officer is not 
harsh or offensive in his decision to leave Tarwater be, but the immediate shift in 
conversation clearly displays his discomfort.  The impact of this scene is to draw a line 
32 
 
 
connecting Tarwater and Bishop through mental disability, real or pretend, and 
demonstrates Tarwater’s disrespect toward those with disabilities, while foreshadowing 
the callous way he later interacts with Bishop. 
The truant officer is trying to be kind and respectful by not forcing Tarwater to 
attend school, and by not asking Mason questions about his condition.  By not enforcing 
Tarwater’s attendance, however, the truant officer displays a conviction that those with 
special needs either cannot handle school or cannot benefit from schooling.  Mason holds 
this view as well, as his scheme with Tarwater demonstrates.  This moment, occurring so 
early in the novel, sets the tone that those with disabilities are confined to their homes 
and are not given the tools to grow.  Bishop’s schooling, then, makes the scene at 
Powderhead seem all the more backward.  Bishop has become autonomous in many 
ways, and Rayber attributes this to Bishop’s schooling.  Rayber thinks about Bishop’s 
progress: “In the winter he sent him to a school for exceptional children and he had made 
great strides.  He could wash himself, dress himself, feed himself, go to the toilet by 
himself and make peanut butter sandwiches though sometimes he put the bread inside” 
(112).  Bishop is not learning reading or arithmetic, but he is learning how to take care of 
himself.  He is learning, while Tarwater actively avoids the growth school affords. 
A final, but powerful, way in which Tarwater both perceives and is offended by 
Bishop’s mirroring himself is in Mason’s attention toward Bishop: 
The old man stared at [Bishop], his lips parting slowly until his mouth 
hung open.  He looked as if he beheld an unspeakable mystery.  The little 
boy made an unintelligible noise and pushed the door almost shut, hiding 
himself all but one spectacled eye.  Suddenly a tremendous indignation 
seized Tarwater.  He eyed the small face peering from the crack.  He 
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searched his mind fiercely for the right word to hurl at it.  Finally he said 
in a slow emphatic voice, “Before you was here, I was here.”  The old man 
caught his shoulder and pulled him back.  “He don’t have good sense,” he 
said.  “Can’t you see he don’t have good sense?  He don’t know what 
you’re talking about.”  The boy grew more furious than ever.  He swung 
around on his heel to leave.  (31) 
 
Interestingly, Bishop’s lack of understanding renders Tarwater momentarily speechless as 
well.  When Tarwater does come up with a response it is dramatic and convoluted, and 
ultimately ineffective.  Tarwater’s reaction is intense and strange, but what is clear is that 
he resents Bishop for his uncle’s fascination with him.  Tarwater does not see any of the 
power or magnificence in Bishop that he so desperately covets for himself, so he closes 
his eyes to any possibility of Bishop’s worth.  In Tarwater’s glory-obsessed mind, Bishop 
has no redeeming qualities, so he does not understand Mason’s affection for him.  He 
would be jealous of anyone Mason cared for, but Bishop’s disability is an easy feature for 
Tarwater to focus on and despise.  Bishop’s disability is only offensive to Tarwater 
secondarily; his main grievance is the way those around him go to lengths to look out for 
Bishop and his well being (spiritual or otherwise) when he himself feels he has only ever 
known the love of a prophet for his pupil.   
 Bishop carries such significance in Tarwater’s struggle that critics often overlook 
Bishop’s worth outside of Tarwater’s or even Rayber’s journey.  Academic focus on 
Bishop centers almost exclusively on his death, and while this is certainly important, it 
can only be discussed here after exploring his life.  Critical analysis has all but dismissed 
who Bishop is apart from his connection to Tarwater’s prophetic calling, but it is 
imperative to examine Bishop as a character unto himself.  Timothy J. Basselin begins to 
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do this in Flannery O’Connor: Writing a Theology of Disabled Humanity (2013), 
focusing on how Bishop’s disability functions within the novel.  Basselin notes 
O’Connor’s early works often portray disability as “the grotesque-as-metaphor-for-
original-sin” (76).  Basselin claims that the novel utilizes this agenda, but also employs 
disability to “say that the grotesque is the authentic good, and our inability to perceive it 
as good signifies how truly we are overcome by original sin” (76).  Basselin’s argument, 
however, focuses on Rayber’s complicated view of his son, where Bishop’s disability 
proves to Rayber’s scientific mind that there must be no God, since through his disability 
Bishop is “useless.”  Rayber’s inexplicable and overwhelming love for his son, on the 
other hand, is likewise useless and consumes him in a way that he cannot rationalize.  
While these observations focus on Bishop’s disability, it is not Rayber’s response to his 
son that signifies Bishop’s disability indicates authentic good, but rather Bishop’s 
characterization that accomplishes this.  The narrative’s portrayal of Bishop reveals a 
character complete with likes, dislikes, interests, fears and quirks.  Surrounding 
characters (and critics) may disregard Bishop’s personality, but his individuality cannot 
be denied. 
There is a split between the narrative’s description of Bishop as friendly, happy, 
and loyal, and the Bishop who Rayber and Tarwater often describe as empty, an idiot, 
and a mistake.  It is this split that creates sympathy for the child whose soul is in the 
balance, while his life is minimized.  Rayber insists his son is a mistake of nature; he 
warns Tarwater to “Just forget Bishop exists.  You haven’t been asked to have anything 
to do with him.  He’s just a mistake of nature.  Try not even to be aware of him” (116).  
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Tarwater views Bishop in an even more unfavorable light and is convinced Bishop is 
placed in his path as a sort of prophetical temptation; Tarwater taunts Rayber by 
describing Bishop as a hog: “‘He eats like a hog and he don’t think no more than a hog 
and when he dies, he’ll rot like a hog.  Me and you too,’ he said, looking back at the 
schoolteacher’s mottled face, ‘will rot like hogs.  The only difference between me and 
you and a hog is me and you can calculate, but there ain’t any difference between him 
and one’” (116).  Such callous descriptions seem outrageous in the novel; just as 
Tarwater hopes to get a reaction from Rayber when describing his son as a hog, so the 
reader is disturbed by the negativity the child receives.  
Rayber and Tarwater judge Bishop by their own standards and hold him 
responsible for their fears.  The split between the way Bishop is perceived and the way he 
is presented, coupled with his tragic death, show both Rayber and Tarwater to be wrong.  
If Bishop’s self was unimportant, as his family believes, his presence would not be so 
pervasive in the novel.  The narrative sets up these dichotomies, where both father and 
cousin undervalue and deny a unique existence while Bishop is continually shown to be 
an individual, to show just how erroneous these characterizations are.  Rayber and 
Tarwater discuss Bishop as a vacant idiot again and again, but the narrative refuses to let 
the reader believe it.   
While Bishop is often undervalued by his family, his mental disability is 
frequently on their minds, and each character has an explanation for it.  Mason believes 
Bishop is disabled because God made him that way to preserve his innocence, and 
perhaps punish a wayward Rayber, and he passes down his convictions about Rayber and 
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Bishop’s mother, Bernice Bishop.  Mason claims “the Lord … had preserved the one 
child [Rayber] had got out of [Bernice Bishop] from being corrupted by such parents.  He 
had preserved him in the only possible way: the child was dim-witted.  The old man 
would pause here and let the weight of this mystery sink in on Tarwater” (9).  Tarwater 
adopts the same conviction at first, believing God has spared Bishop from evil by 
creating him in such a way, although the lack of glamour in being called to baptize an 
“idiot child” consumes Tarwater for a time.  Mason entreats Tarwater to carry out the 
mission, “‘If by the time I die,’ he had said to Tarwater, ‘I haven’t got him baptized, it’ll 
be up to you.  It’ll be the first mission the Lord sends you.’”  Tarwater, however, is not 
convinced.  “The boy doubted very much that his first mission would be to baptize a dim-
witted child.  ‘Oh no it won’t be,’ he said.  ‘He don’t mean for me to finish up your 
leavings.  He has other things in mind for me’” (9).  Tarwater resents the role Bishop 
plays in Mason’s plan for Tarwater’s life; upon seeing Bishop,  
the revelation came, silent, implacable, direct as a bullet.  He did not look 
into the eyes of any fiery beast or see a burning bush.  He only knew, with 
a certainty sunk in despair, that he was expected to baptize the child he 
saw and begin the life his great-uncle had prepared for him.  He knew that 
he was called to be a prophet and that the ways of his prophecy would not 
be remarkable.  (90)   
 
Tarwater’s resentment toward Bishop is clear when he contemplates “The Lord out of 
dust had created him, had made him blood and nerve and mind, had made him to bleed 
and weep and think, and set him in a world of loss and fire all to baptize one idiot child 
that He need not have created in the first place and to cry out a gospel just as foolish.  He 
tried to shout, ‘NO!’ but it was like trying to shout in his sleep” (90).  Tarwater rejects his 
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calling to baptize Bishop, not from an objection to baptism or prophets, but from a 
resentment of the lack of grandeur and magnificence of baptizing Bishop.  The calling is 
not on the epic level Tarwater hungers for.    
Bishop’s mother responds to her son in a more calloused way than many of the 
other satellite characters in the novel:   
By temperament and training she was ready to handle an exceptional 
child, but not one as exceptional as Bishop, not one bearing her own 
family name and the face of “that horrible old man.”  She had returned 
once in the last two years and demanded that he put Bishop in an 
institution because she said he could not adequately care for him – though 
it was plain from the look of him that he thrived like an air plant.  (181) 
 
Bernice abandons her son because his disability is too close to her.  Her demand that 
Rayber institutionalize Bishop, however, is the truly cruel action because not only does 
Rayber report Bishop is doing well, but she would rather have her child in an institution 
than with his father.  She initially leaves because she cannot bear to be around her child, 
and then she returns because she does not want her child around.  The way in which this 
information is presented is crucial because it creates sympathy for Bishop.  When Bernice 
abandons her husband and son, it is a tragic family moment, but it is a flaw on her part; 
she does not have the strength to be with her disabled son on a daily basis.  When she 
returns, however, and demands Bishop be institutionalized, she is faulting both Rayber’s 
ability to care for Bishop and Bishop’s ability to exist in the non-institutional world.  
Rayber’s response is to “[knock] her not quite halfway across the room” (181).  Rayber’s 
indignation is understandable since Bishop’s progress and his attachment to and comfort 
with his father have already been established in the narrative when Bernice arrives.  
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Bishop is well adjusted where he is, and when his own mother demands he go to a facility 
run by strangers, she is treating him as an object that can be tossed aside when no longer 
wanted.   
In addition to familial reactions, Bishop has two encounters at the lake with non-
family which represent both the negative and sympathetic attitudes of the larger 
community.  The group of dancing teenagers at the restaurant demonstrates a negative 
response to disability.  The description of the teenagers is not flattering: “They danced 
with a furious stern concentration.  Tarwater, his eyes dark and distant, stared through 
them.  They might have been insects buzzing across the surface of his vision.  When the 
music whined to a stop, they clambered back to their table and sprawled in their chairs” 
(190).  The group is not enjoying the dance, although there is presumably no other reason 
to dance than for enjoyment.  Tarwater is unimpressed, and the teens return to their table 
with a certain sloth.   
Bishop is impressed, though his response when the dancing stops is indicative of 
his own nature rather than any sort of feather in the dancers’ caps: “Bishop was 
entranced.  He stood up in his chair, watching them, his head hanging forward as if any 
moment it might drop off.”  When the dance ends, “The child was jumping up and down 
in his chair, roaring his disappointment” (190).  Bishop has probably never seen dancing 
before (indeed, it is difficult to imagine Rayber dancing in front of his child) and he 
reacts with characteristic fascination, awe, and appreciation.  The dancers, however, 
respond to Bishop with indignation: “As soon as the dancers saw him, he stopped making 
the noise and stood still, devouring them with his gape.  An angry silence fell over them.  
39 
 
 
Their look was shocked and affronted as if they had been betrayed by a fault in creation, 
something that should have been corrected before they were allowed to see it” (190).  The 
teens are not confused or uncomfortable; rather, they are “shocked and affronted” as if 
Bishop has done something wrong, as if his existence is somehow wrong.  Their outraged 
reaction represents a possible, if not common, reaction to those with mental disability, 
both in O’Connor’s time and today.  The dancers see something different from 
themselves and do not have the scope or maturity to see Bishop for what he is: a little boy 
who likes dancing.  Rayber’s reaction to this indignation betrays his love for his son as 
clearly as any action could: “With pleasure Rayber could have dashed across the room 
and swung his lifted chair in their faces” (190).  Rayber resents the group of strangers 
because their judgment of Bishop dehumanizes him and Rayber, who has experienced 
Bishop’s unique personality more than anyone, is offended on his son’s behalf. 
 The woman who works the front desk at the lake resort is perhaps the most 
sympathetic character to interact with Bishop.  Rather than ignore him or be 
uncomfortable around him, she seems to be fascinated with him.  She does not treat 
Bishop as if he is just like everyone else, but rather lavishes him with attention.  When 
they first arrive at the lake,  
Bishop was a few feet away, gaping at her.  “What’s your name, Sugar 
pie?” she asked.  “His name is Bishop,” Rayber said shortly.  He was 
always irked when the child was stared at.  The woman tilted her head 
sympathetically.  “I reckon you’re taking him off to give his mother a little 
rest,” she said, her eyes full of curiosity and compassion.  “I have him all 
the time,” he said and added before he could stop himself, “his mother 
abandoned him.”  “No!” she breathed.  “Well,” she said, “it takes all kinds 
of women.  I couldn’t leave a child like that.”  You can’t even take your 
eyes off him, he thought irritably and began to fill out the card.  “Are the 
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boats for rent?” he asked without looking up.  “Free for guests,” she said, 
“but anybody gets drowned, that’s their lookout.  How about him?  Can he 
sit still in a boat?”  “Nothing ever happens to him,” he murmured, 
finishing the card and turning it around to her.  (152) 
 
The woman’s curiosity makes Rayber very uncomfortable, and yet it does not seem to 
come from a place of malice – she is not gawking at Bishop, but rather she is giving him 
her full attention.  Rayber does not like her staring at Bishop, yet her kindness is evident, 
if not somewhat closed-minded.  Her absorption with Bishop lasts throughout their stay; 
later, “The woman had drawn him to an icecooler and produced a green popsickle which 
she held up for him while she gazed fascinated into his mysterious face” (168).  When 
Tarwater yells at Bishop in front of her, she both comes to Bishop’s defense and displays 
ignorance: “‘Mind how you talk to one of them there, you boy!’ the woman hissed.  
[Tarwater] looked at her as if it were the first time she had spoken to him.  ‘Them there 
what?’ he murmured.  ‘That there kind,’ she said, looking at him fiercely as if he had 
profaned the holy” (155).  The woman is standing up for Bishop, encouraging Tarwater 
to be kind to him, but the reason she gives for this necessary kindness is that Bishop is 
disabled.  The woman implies that those with mental disabilities need special treatment, 
and while perhaps special treatment is in order to reverse the especially negative 
treatment Bishop sometimes receives because of his disability, the woman’s repeated 
categorizing Bishop as “that kind” limits his humanity.  Whatever “kind” Bishop is, it is 
not the same category that she and Tarwater are in.  Tarwater’s response here is 
fascinating; while Tarwater resents Bishop for his disability at first, that facet of the boy 
has been eclipsed by his relevance to Tarwater’s fate.  It is as if Tarwater has forgotten 
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about the initial insult he felt over Bishop’s disability and is now only thinking of 
Bishop’s unbaptized state as a threat to his own attempts at independence from his 
prophetic calling.   
It is necessary to discuss Rayber’s feelings toward his son last, both because they 
are myriad and conflicting and also because they are inseparable from a discussion of 
Bishop’s death.  Rayber holds two views on his son’s mental disability.  In one instance, 
born of despair and morbidity, Rayber acknowledges that he “did not believe that he 
himself was formed in the image and likeness of God but that Bishop was he had no 
doubt” (113).  Basselin’s reading of this moment is that “one can interpret Rayber’s 
naming Bishop as being in the image of God as Rayber’s sarcastic view of God, a God 
who is made in the image of the imbecile Bishop,” since sarcasm “fits well with a good 
majority of Rayber’s philosophy” (75-76).  Outside of this moment, Rayber explains his 
son solely through terms of mistakes and accidents of nature.  Rayber’s “normal way of 
looking on Bishop was as an x signifying the general hideousness of fate,” where “The 
little boy was part of a simple equation that required no further solution” (113).  Rayber 
argues against his uncle’s desire to baptize Bishop, believing that “You could slosh water 
on him for the rest of his life and he’d still be an idiot.  Five years old for all eternity, 
useless forever” (34).  Rayber is not concerned with Bishop’s soul, but rather with the 
limitations he will encounter in this life.  The thought of Bishop as God’s image operates 
in a paradoxical way – Rayber is scorning the image of God by claiming, as Basselin 
observes, his mirror is a mentally disabled boy.  He is bitterly rejecting his uncle’s faith, 
in essence claiming there can be no God because he cannot understand why God would 
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create his son to be disabled.  In a confrontation with Mason, Rayber taunts his uncle to 
“Ask the Lord why He made [Bishop] an idiot in the first place, uncle.  Tell him I want to 
know why!” (33-34).  
The other side of Rayber’s thought is that if Bishop is made in God’s likeness, 
both Bishop and God are pure, innocent, and good.  Rayber is linking Bishop to the old 
euphemism that people with special needs are God’s children, or children touched by 
God.  The radical split here occurs not because he still falters about his faith (or lack 
thereof); Rayber has almost completely shut down the religious side of himself.  The 
reason Rayber has such conflicting ideas is because he feels such extreme love for his son 
(even though he wishes to control his emotions) that he can be consumed by it.  While he 
initially demeans and shuts out Bishop in favor of Tarwater, Rayber absolutely loves his 
son in what Basselin considers to be “no fuller expression of the good in O’Connor’s 
work” (77).  In one of O’Connor’s most astonishing passages, Rayber explores his 
“horrifying love” for Bishop: 
For the most part Rayber lived with him without being painfully aware of 
his presence but the moments would still come when, rushing from some 
inexplicable part of himself, he would experience a love for the child so 
outrageous that he would be left shocked and depressed for days, and 
trembling for his sanity.… The little boy was part of a simple equation that 
required no further solution, except at the moments when with little or no 
warning he would feel himself overwhelmed by the horrifying love.  
Anything he looked at too long could bring it on.  Bishop did not have to 
be around.  It could be a stick or a stone, the line of a shadow, the absurd 
old man’s walk of a starling crossing the sidewalk.  If, without thinking, 
he lent himself to it, he would feel suddenly a morbid surge of the love 
that terrified him – powerful enough to throw him to the ground in an act 
of idiot praise…. The love that would overcome him … was not the kind 
that could be used for the child’s improvement or his own.  It was love 
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without reason, love for something futureless, love that appeared to exist 
only to be itself, imperious and all demanding, the kind that would cause 
him to make a fool of himself in an instant.  And it only began with 
Bishop.  It began with Bishop and then like an avalanche covered 
everything his reason hated.  (113-114) 
 
Rayber experiences intense, painful feelings of love for his son – a love that is 
unpredictable, often uncontained, and most importantly, the gateway to all of Rayber’s 
emotions.  
Rayber’s reaction to Bishop’s diagnosis of mental disability speaks to his 
conflicted attitude toward his son.  Bishop’s doctor advises Rayber, “‘You should be 
grateful his health is good.  In addition to this, I’ve seen them born blind as well, some 
without arms and legs, and one with a heart outside.’  [Rayber] had lurched up, almost 
ready to strike the man.  ‘How can I be grateful,’ he had hissed, ‘when one – just one – is 
born with a heart outside?’  ‘You’d better try,’ the doctor had said” (136).  Rayber misses 
the doctor’s point, crass as it may be.  The doctor enjoins Rayber to appreciate Bishop as 
he is, and warns him that Bishop’s mental disability could have come with severe 
physical disabilities as well.  Rayber, however, cannot move past the outrage that Bishop 
is disabled at all and cannot see the silver lining in Bishop’s diagnosis.  Rayber can only 
see the possibilities removed from Bishop and does not acknowledge the gift that Bishop 
is to him.  Bishop’s life means nothing to Tarwater and often means nothing to Rayber.  
They have looked into Bishop only as far as his disability and have concluded that either 
Bishop has no interior self, or the self that is present is of no consequence.  And yet 
Bishop refuses to be ignored in the novel. 
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Rayber feels cheated in some cosmic way by Bishop’s disability and he refers to 
his son time and again as a mistake, an accident.  But Rayber cannot stamp out his love 
for his son.  Rayber  
could control his terrifying love as long as it had its focus on Bishop, but if 
anything happened to the child, he would have to face it in itself.  Then the 
whole world would become his idiot child.  He had thought what he would 
have to do if anything happened to Bishop.  He would have with one 
supreme effort to resist the recognition; with very nerve and muscle and 
thought, he would have to resist feeling anything at all, thinking anything 
at all, he would have to anesthetize his life.  (181)   
 
This scene offers a chilling moment of foreshadowing where Rayber predicts not only 
that something will indeed happen to Bishop, but also that his life will become barren.  It 
will not be his choice or by his will, but the end result will be the same – Rayber’s life 
will essentially be over without his son.  When Rayber imagines ridding his life of 
Tarwater, his plans center on Bishop: 
 He thought with horror of being stuck with [Tarwater] for good and began 
to consider ways that he might hasten his departure.  He knew he would 
never leave as long as Bishop was around.  The thought flew through his 
mind that he might put Bishop in an institution for a few weeks.  He was 
shaken and turned his mind to other things.  For a while he dozed and 
dreamed that he and Bishop were speeding away in the car, escaping 
safely from a lowering tornado-like cloud.  (199) 
 
Rayber cannot tolerate the thought of being without Bishop, and also imagines his 
freedom and safety with Bishop.  For all his talk of Bishop’s social uselessness, even in 
his fantasies of safety he is with Bishop.   
In much the same way, when Rayber tries to drown Bishop, he only falters when 
he considers his life without his son.  Rayber had taken Bishop to the beach intending to 
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drown him, and once in the water, Rayber “pushed down again angrily with all his force 
until the struggling ceased under his hands.  He stood sweating in the water, his own 
mouth as slack as the child’s had been.  The body, caught by an undertow, almost got 
away from him, but he managed to come to himself and snatch it” (142).  It is only after 
this horrible action that Rayber considers the consequence of what he has done as he 
looks at Bishop’s body: “as he looked at it, he had a moment of complete terror in which 
he envisioned his life without the child.  He began to shout frantically” (142).  It is 
interesting that Bishop’s body is just “it,” as if Rayber cannot bring himself to label the 
thing in front of him as his son.  Doing so would destroy the detachment Rayber strives 
for each day.  However, Rayber cannot escape the truth of what he has done, and so he 
cries for help.  Bishop’s life is suddenly, if only momentarily, more important to Rayber 
than the life he is denied because of his disability. 
Rayber’s feelings toward Bishop show Bishop is loveable and deserving of love.  
Rayber’s love for Bishop is the greatest, if not only, example of familial love in the 
novel, and since it is between a distant father and a disabled son, it is essential that 
Rayber’s feelings for his son be reclaimed from a long tradition of critical analysis.  
Many critics claim that Rayber’s realization that he will feel no pain over his son’s death 
is evidence that he does not love his son.  Thelma J. Shinn’s landmark piece, “Flannery 
O’Connor and the Violence of Grace” (1968), has set the stage for critical interpretation.  
Shinn traces Rayber’s reaction to Bishop’s death through his conscious rejection of 
spiritual redemption.  She notes “Rayber had had the opportunity to be saved when he 
realized that Bishop was dead, but he had already made his decision to reject grace before 
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that” (72), pointing to Rayber’s determination that he “kept himself upright on a very 
narrow line between madness and emptiness, and when the time came for him to lose his 
balance, he intended to lurch toward emptiness and fall on the side of his choice” (Violent 
115).  Therefore, Shinn concludes that “Rayber’s lack of pain illustrates his severance 
from God; he is confined to the painless emptiness of Limbo and denied the purifying 
pain of Purgatory” (72).  For Shinn and many critics after, Rayber’s lack of pain (and 
subsequently his emptiness) is the fate he chose for himself when he denied spirituality.  
This reading relies heavily on O’Connor’s own purported beliefs about religion, 
but the text itself supports a different interpretation.  Rayber has not newly rejected his 
faith – he has long lived a life without religion.  The scene surrounding Rayber’s collapse 
focuses on Rayber’s realization that his son is dead, and Shinn’s interpretation removes 
Bishop and his murder from this scene entirely.  This is not some nameless trauma – this 
moment for Rayber is wholly about his son and what his son means to him.  Rayber’s 
peculiar reaction to Bishop’s death shows his intense love for his son.  Rayber responds 
in two ways: he realizes he will feel no pain, and he collapses.  Rayber will never again 
feel pain because he will never again feel anything at all since Bishop is gone.  After 
hearing the struggle between Tarwater and Bishop, Rayber remains at the window of his 
room, trying to remember something: “It came to him finally as something so distant and 
vague in his mind that it might already have happened, a long time ago.  It was that 
tomorrow they would drag the pond for Bishop” (203).  It is at this moment, when the 
magnitude of his loss is put into the practical, ascetic terms he clings to, that Rayber truly 
grasps what has happened.  Unlike Rayber’s unsuccessful attempt to drown Bishop, 
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where the boy’s body is it, Rayber’s realization here is not that they will pull out it or the 
body but rather that they will drag the pond for Bishop.  Rayber “stood waiting for the 
raging pain, the intolerable hurt that was his due, to begin, so that he could ignore it, but 
he continued to feel nothing.  He stood light-headed at the window and it was not until he 
realized there would be no pain that he collapsed” (203).  Rayber’s lack of pain is not 
from any paucity of love for his son, but rather from the sudden and permanent loss of all 
emotion.  As he feared, the whole world became his idiot son, and as his son is dead, so 
the world is dead to him.  
Rayber’s collapse is a strong physical reaction to a mental distress that is too often 
overlooked.  Rayber expresses his love for Bishop almost entirely through physical signs; 
he holds Bishop comfortingly even while telling him to shut up when Tarwater yells at 
him, and sits quietly with his chin on Bishop’s head as a form of relaxation when they are 
in the park.  Upon arriving at the lake, “Bishop climbed out of the car and thrust his face 
against his father’s side.  Absently Rayber put his hand on the little boy’s ear and rubbed 
it gingerly, his fingers tingling as if they touched the sensitive scar of some old wound” 
(151).  The physical, rather than emotional, nature of Rayber’s response to his son’s 
death is indicative not of Rayber’s callousness, but of the manner in which he has always 
related to his son.  He does not cry out just as he never cooed to his son – in happiness 
Rayber held Bishop, and in despair he collapses.  It is a reaction he cannot reason himself 
out of – his body is reacting to what his psyche can no longer face.  When Rayber listens 
to the struggle between nephew and son that will surely end in his son’s death, his 
physical description is that of agony: “He clenched his teeth.  The muscles in his face 
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contracted and revealed lines of pain beneath harder than bone.  He set his jaw” (202).  
Rayber is not tense because he is keeping himself from saving Bishop – he knows that he 
is too far away; he is frozen to the spot with impotence.  Rayber’s love for his son is so 
important that it is essential that it be the last thing Rayber ever feels. 
Bishop’s death is of course crucial to not only Rayber, but Tarwater as well.  
Popular critical interpretations posit the baptism/murder as the central action of the story.  
Jason Ambrosiano, in “‘From the Blood of Abel to His Own’: Intersubjectivity and 
Salvation in Flannery O’Connor’s The Violent Bear it Away” (2007), views Bishop’s 
death as a necessary sacrifice, converging from Mason, Rayber, and Tarwater’s shared 
prophetic and familial bond, fulfilling Tarwater’s journey to know God.  Ambrosiano 
notes, “Alive, Bishop sustains the prophets’ spiritual/somatic bond; as sacrifice he 
affirms it.  As bodily continuation of the prophets’ transcendent history, Bishop is a 
‘logical’ means of converging the violent irrationality shared by his relatives into their 
prophetic realization manifested in Tarwater” (138).  Ambrosiano emphasizes Bishop’s 
importance to his relative’s stories, but fails to address Bishop’s individuality.  Bishop 
does not share in the prophetic calling of his kin, though he is present in each of their 
struggles with and against religion.  Ambrosiano views Bishop as “a central character in 
all of (his kin’s) narratives and the kindred point where they all meet.  He catalyzes the 
violent energies and desires shared by the three, and thus he inevitably shapes their 
product” (138).  Ambrosiano sees Bishop’s real value in his death, and in the change his 
death affords in Tarwater, when “Tarwater’s desired shout from God reached him from 
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the blood of Abel, not Cain” (138).  Thus, for Ambrosiano, Bishop’s death is most 
significant in its baptismal aspect, as a spiritual catalyst for Tarwater.  
Joseph Zornado rejects the notion that Bishop needs baptism at all in “A 
Becoming Habit: Flannery O’Connor’s Fiction of Unknowing” (1997).  Zornado notes, 
“For some readers and critics of O’Connor problematizing the ritual of baptism … 
constitutes a violation of her fiction that, ultimately, threatens to erode a critical 
consensus some think exists about the relationship between her faith and fiction.  For 
these critics the outer ritual of baptism and the inner transformation are one” (28), and 
further reflects that “Tarwater’s baptism/drowning of Bishop obscures, and even 
undermines, traditional Orthodox definitions of baptism and dogmatic explanations that 
might be applied in order to make sense of it” (34).  While Zornado does recognize 
O’Connor’s belief in the baptismal ritual, he ultimately suggests the ritual’s futility for 
Bishop.  Zornado argues, “By the end of the novel baptism has become a central symbol 
not of grace, stability, essence, and truth, but of difference, of the gap, the abyss” (49).  
According to Zornado, because of Bishop’s mental disability his “status as an infant 
corrupted by Adam's sin suddenly becomes suspect, and as a child, Bishop cannot 
understand the ritual and the question remains whether he requires it for the remission of 
sins.  Further, the name Bishop clearly suggests that he already belongs to the kingdom of 
heaven” (51-52).  Ultimately, the baptismal act seeks to work out Tarwater’s conflicting 
directives, but has no value for Bishop.  
While Zornado does not try to twist Bishop’s death into something positive or 
necessary, as many critics before him do, he fails to recognize the role Bishop’s 
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personality plays in such a scenario.  Zornado points to Bishop’s disability, age, and 
name as reasons why he does not need baptism, but it is Bishop’s personality that creates 
tragedy within the novel.  As Zornado has shown, Bishop does not need to be baptized.  
As I have shown, he does not deserve to be drowned.   
Finally, Bishop’s death is not the turning point for Tarwater that it is often 
interpreted as.  When Tarwater drowns Bishop, he does not stop to think about the life he 
is destroying or the presence he is taking from the world.  Tarwater’s only concerns after 
drowning Bishop, or at least the only concerns he lends voice to, focus on the act of 
baptism.  When Tarwater hitches a ride with a truck driver, his preoccupation is clear: 
Tarwater confesses, “‘I baptized him.’  ‘Huh?’ the man said.  ‘It was an accident.  I didn’t 
mean to,’ [Tarwater] said breathlessly.  Then in a calmer voice he said, ‘The words just 
came out of themselves but it don’t mean nothing.  You can’t be born again.’  ‘Make 
sense,’ the man said.  ‘I only meant to drown him,’ the boy said” (209).  Tarwater is not 
disturbed with killing his cousin, but rather with the unintentional baptism that 
simultaneously takes place.  Bishop refuses to be forgotten entirely, however.  Tarwater 
asks a local boy for water; “As [the water] touched the deeper parts of his face, a shock 
ran through him, as if he had never been touched by water before.  He looked down into a 
grey clear pool, down and down to where two silent serene eyes were gazing at him.  He 
tore his head away from the bucket and stumbled backwards” (222).  Perhaps Tarwater 
sees Mason’s eyes, perhaps Bishop’s, but this moment shows Tarwater is still fleeing 
from his crime and refusing to face his actions.  Even after his death, Tarwater cannot 
appreciate Bishop for his soul.  Bishop’s personality does not slow Tarwater’s hand.   
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Bishop is drowned in the holy water Tarwater has been so desperate to escape, but 
this is not Tarwater’s redemptive moment.  He does not leave the lake a changed and 
determined prophet.  Tarwater continually acts through fire, so Bishop’s watery death 
symbolically has little meaning for Tarwater.  It is only after the burning cigarettes and 
the burning liquor drug him enough to be sexually violated by a man who gives him a 
ride that Tarwater awakens with burned eyes and his prophetic mission burned into his 
consciousness.  Tarwater must be cleansed in fire rather than water before he is to be 
awakened to his destiny, but the baptism, this massive moment in the story, takes place in 
water.  This is a strong narrative clue that the moment is not as pivotal for Tarwater as it 
appears to be, or should be.  The scene’s pointlessness, then, is the narrative’s strongest 
way to create sympathy for Bishop. 
Bishop’s bond with and affinity for water, rather than fire, links him to an old, 
fluid, natural world – he evokes creation and repeatedly conjures images of timelessness.  
Rayber describes Bishop as looking “like the old man grown backwards to the lowest 
form of innocence” (111), and thinks of Bishop as “dim and ancient, like a child who had 
been a child for centuries” (90).  Bishop is linked to the natural world and the 
timelessness thereof and there is something eternal in his joyful and awestruck 
personality.  Where Tarwater seeks to evade and destroy, Bishop repeatedly appreciates 
and enjoys the world around him.  The fact that the pivotal moment in the novel is not 
Tarwater’s pivotal spiritual moment indicates that he is not the only center of the story, 
even if the narrative focuses largely on him.  Bishop’s death may be at Tarwater’s hand, 
but Tarwater does not retain the control he so desperately strives for – the climax happens 
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in water rather than fire, and he does the exact thing he was acting to avoid: baptize 
Bishop.  Tarwater may take Bishop’s life but he cannot take away his significance, and 
removing the moment of Bishop’s death entirely from Tarwater’s control grants Bishop 
power even in death.   
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Chapter 2 
Knowing the Unknowable:  
Faulkner’s Mentally Disabled Characters 
The Sound and the Fury 
William Faulkner offers the same sympathetic and critical conclusion of the 
characters’ treatment as Flannery O’Connor, but does so in a very different way.  While 
O’Connor’s narratives employ the extreme mistreatment of Lucynell and Bishop and the 
exaggerated negativity of their peers toward them to explore the injustice toward 
characters with special needs, Faulkner goes straight to the source by granting his 
mentally disabled characters extended, dedicated narrative attention to view their plight 
directly.  He too offers up scenes of extreme mistreatment and of characters with mental 
disabilities being treated as grotesque and ultimately alien, but he explores the psyche of 
his mentally disabled characters to portray them as infinitely complex and human, which 
makes their peer’s treatment of them as mindless and worthless seem so staggeringly 
unfair.  Faulkner represents his mentally disabled characters in much more depth and 
spends more narrative time focusing on them than O’Connor does, and the result is more 
developed characters with complex interiorities.  While O’Connor presents her characters 
in relation to the families around them, Faulkner presents Benjy’s inner thoughts, his very 
consciousness, by granting him first person narration, and spends a great deal of narrative 
time on Ike’s solitary journey, exploring him and his motivations without the filter of the 
surrounding community.  Faulkner brings his audience to not only sympathize with these 
characters, but also to come closer to knowing them.  
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The Sound and the Fury (1929) tells the story of the Compson family through the 
narratives of the three Compson brothers: Benjy, Quentin, and Jason.  Benjy, the 
youngest brother, is the first narrator the reader encounters and his severe mental 
disability is made evident through his limited and largely sensory narrative.  Although 
three of the four narratives in the novel, including Benjy’s, take place on Easter weekend 
of 1928, Benjy seems to exist in his memories, moving between times when his beloved 
sister Caddy is present in his childhood some thirty years earlier and events that 
drastically change his life, such as his castration.  The fourth and final narrator represents 
an outside voice and dedicates some time to following Benjy and Dilsey to Easter 
services.   
Benjy’s narrative has received ample attention.  The body of literary criticism 
surrounding Faulkner’s breakthrough novel is as substantial and daunting as the novel 
itself.  Benjy’s narrative has sparked debate and interpretation as much as, if not more so 
than, any other section in the novel.  Much of the criticism surrounding Benjy focuses on 
the ways in which his narrative speaks to a larger tradition of interpreting experience and 
telling one’s own story.  L. Moffitt Cecil, in “A Rhetoric for Benjy” (1970), displays the 
interest many scholars have in the narrative value of Benjy’s section: “When William 
Faulkner decided to filter Section 1 of The Sound and the Fury through the consciousness 
of Benjy Compson, he took upon himself as author the extraordinary task of improvising 
a language suitable to a mute, an idiot” (32).  Cecil further expounds, “It is the fact of 
Benjy’s idiocy which compounded Faulkner’s problems and demanded that he effect the 
major authorial miracle of causing not only a mute to ‘speak,’ but a blithering idiot to 
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narrate the first section of The Sound and the Fury” (34).  The events and experiences 
Benjy recounts, and the fact that he narrates at all, have sustained almost a century of 
critical interest.  
Olga Vickery lays the foundation for most critical approaches to Benjy’s narrative 
when she recounts that, “Our first impression of the Benjy section is that it presents a 
state of utter chaos for which the only possible justification is the fact that Benjy is an 
idiot and therefore has the right to be confused” (32).  Benjy’s forgiven simplicity is 
echoed by André Bleikasten, who remarks in The Most Splendid Failure (1976) that 
“Benjy is an idiot, and all that is left to him is sensory and emotional response, perception 
without intellection, and a capacity for the raw intensities of pleasure and pain.  He is 
humanity at its most elemental and most archaic, the zero degree of consciousness.  His 
quasi-tropistic reactions to the conditions he meets are in fact all he is” (71).  Benjy’s 
mental disability, then, immediately causes and excuses the selective and jarring nature of 
his narrative.   
Benjy’s narrative is jarring in part because his thoughts move between memories 
and the present with seemingly little or no warning or organization.  There is critical 
consensus that Benjy moves into his memories, either deliberately or not, because they 
are moments more comforting or pivotal than his present environment can afford; as Paul 
M. Hedeen summarizes in “A Symbolic Center in a Conceptual Country: A Gassian 
Rubric for The Sound and the Fury” (1985), “Faulkner creates a poetry that slips from 
one image into another and another, and the past is relived again and again as those few 
poor moments of satiety, of Caddy, are asserted and reasserted” (630).  The loss Benjy 
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experiences is thus significant on many levels, both to himself and to the structure of his 
narrative.  Bleikasten speaks of Benjy’s memories of Caddy, noting that,  
Benjy’s moaning points at once to an absence, an absence which the 
perception of anything however remotely related to his lost sister instantly 
quickens and thickens in his vacant mind.  To Benjy, Caddy is the nearest 
of absences.  His memory has no memories.  He cannot remember, he 
cannot forget.  For him it is as though Caddy had only departed a few 
seconds ago: her trace is forever fresh, and the merest sensation … recalls 
her presence with agonizing immediacy.  (58-59) 
 
Benjy then is both a character who experiences specific losses, and a way to explore loss 
generally.   
This tenuous position as character/symbol becomes problematic when Benjy’s 
status as a disabled character is considered.  If Benjy is a character, how can his loss be 
conflated to mean loss in general, and if he is a symbol, how does that speak to the reality 
of persons with mental disabilities?  Maria Truchan-Tataryn finds the credibility of 
Benjy’s depiction as mentally disabled to be particularly troubling.  Truchan-Tataryn 
asserts that, “Despite the growth of a global disability rights movement and the 
development of the discipline of disability studies in the humanities, the figure of Benjy’s 
mindless, voiceless subhumanity continues to resonate through Faulknerian scholarship 
as a believable portrait of disability” (160).  The greatest danger surrounding Benjy, then, 
is what he, as a representation of disability, is capable of doing to the definition of 
disability within society.  Truchan-Tataryn’s greatest critique is that,  
For critics, Faulkner’s rendering of human blankness has typified 
individuals medically labeled as idiots.  Benjy, however, more accurately 
illuminates not the (lack of) subjectivity of a cognitively impaired 
individual in lived experience but rather imaginings projected upon a 
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population denied agency and voice by authors of public policy as well as 
narrative texts.  (163) 
 
Although Truchan-Tataryn’s concern is closely allied with my own, it is misdirected.  
She observes that critical analyses of Benjy as a realistic depiction of mental disability 
“fail to challenge the erroneous association of intellectual disability with a mental, 
emotional and social emptiness” (167).  While this is undoubtedly true, it accepts that 
Benjy is, in fact, characterized as empty.  Truchan-Tataryn’s argument should not be 
aimed at Benjy’s depiction in the novel, but rather at the body of criticism that has 
unquestionably accepted the interpretation of Benjy as mindless.   
While decades of scholarly exploration have added layer upon layer of 
interpretation to Benjy’s narrative, something essential to his experience has been 
overlooked.  While the critics who, like Hedeen, mine Benjy’s mental/temporal 
fluctuations to unearth fascinating insight into the ways in which Benjy creates comfort 
for himself, they do not then connect these insights to what it means that Benjy can and 
does actively comfort himself.  Such critics overlook Benjy as a character and focus 
instead on the text attributed to him; Truchan-Tataryn goes beyond Benjy to focus on 
what interpretations of his characterization do to larger social views of disability.  What 
these critics hold in common is their conviction that Benjy is mindless, and while most 
critics accept this and instead explore how mindlessness is achieved on a literary level, I 
reject the interpretation of Benjy as mindless and empty.  Rather, Benjy does not do 
damage to stereotypes of disability because he is not mindless, nor is he depicted in such 
a way.  It is the decades of unified criticism (and Faulkner’s own problematic 
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commentary) that have cemented such an interpretation.  The novel itself both raises the 
question of Benjy’s emptiness and shows that although he is extremely limited, he is in 
no way empty.  
All this is to say that critics make assumptions about Benjy’s capabilities and 
cognitive capacities because of his social status as “idiot,” and yet the text insists Benjy is 
more aware than those around him perceive him to be.  As Ted Roggenbuck observes in 
“‘The way he looked said Hush’: Benjy’s Mental Atrophy in The Sound and the Fury” 
(2005), “From the time of its original publication to the present, too many readers of 
Benjy’s narrative have simply accepted this assumption [of Benjy’s mindlessness] and as 
a consequence have oversimplified Benjy as a character” (590).  Roggenbuck makes a 
persuasive and informed case against Benjy’s perceived mindlessness and/or emptiness, 
arguing that although Benjy’s intellect does not progress past childhood, “his mental state 
changes significantly through the course of his life” (581).  In essence, “As a child Benjy 
demonstrates greater intellectual ability than most critics give him credit for, but by 1928 
he has so withdrawn both mentally and emotionally from the world and people around 
him that he no longer possesses enough emotional investment in it to attempt to interpret 
much of what transpires” (Roggenbuck 581).   
Roggenbuck sees Benjy’s cries as proof of a greater cognition than he is 
traditionally granted.  The scene where Benjy burns his hand is often cited as an example 
of Benjy’s limited, if not absent, ability to understand his surroundings: “I put my hand 
out to where the fire had been.  ‘Catch him.’  Dilsey said.  ‘Catch him back.’  My hand 
jerked back and I put it in my mouth and Dilsey caught me…. She took my hand out of 
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my mouth.  My voice went louder then and my hand tried to go back to my mouth, but 
Dilsey held it.  My voice went loud” (59).  Because Benjy does not say that his hand is 
burned or that it hurts, but rather reports that his hand goes to his mouth and his voice is 
loud, many critics take this to mean that he does not understand cause and effect, or even 
the concept of pain.  Roggenbuck reclaims this scene, however, by observing Benjy’s 
“detachment says more about his diminished interest in his current existence than it does 
about the limits of his cognitive abilities” (582).  Benjy thus relays so much of his past 
not because he cannot locate himself in time, but because that is where his interest is.  In 
his childhood Caddy attempts to communicate with Benjy, and since she is absent in 
1928, “when those around him concern themselves more with suppressing his crying than 
with trying to understand it, when trying to communicate becomes mostly pointless 
because nobody will pay enough attention to understand him, Benjy’s interest in his own 
voice and the voices of those around him deadens” (Roggenbuck 583).   
Roggenbuck further rejects Benjy’s blankness by noting that “in two rare 
moments of directly expressing preference Benjy reports, ‘I liked to smell Versh’s 
house,’ and ‘Dilsey finished putting me to bed.  The bed smelled like T.P.  I liked it’ (28, 
29) … Many discussions of Benjy deny that he can express preference” (591, original 
italics).  Benjy is not mindless or empty at all; he not only knows what he wants, but 
knows what he likes and what he does not.  Benjy may be limited, but he very much 
exhibits mental and emotional awareness.   
The seemingly endless number of critical interpretations of Benjy’s narrative 
speaks to the richness of experience and communication found therein.  Many critics use 
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Benjy’s memories against him, claiming both the disordered nature and simplistic 
representation of these memories reveal his inability to relate to or invest in his world due 
to his mental disability.  Paul M. Hedeen echoes the critical commonplace that Benjy’s 
“innocent (uninterpreting) egoism and his absolute objectivity … make his past 
experiences different from those rendered in traditional fictions” (630), and asserts that 
Benjy’s memories “contain events that Benjy has either witnessed or participated in.  All 
are vividly called forth and innocently rendered; all are uninterpreted and unchanged.  In 
essence, all are narratively leveled by the muted voice of Benjy’s idiocy” (629).  Such an 
objective narrative would accomplish what Leon Howard, in “The Composition of The 
Sound and the Fury” (1981), identifies as “experimental writing … in which the author 
achieves discipline by adopting the point of view of a character more simplistic than the 
story he tells” (114).  If Benjy is unable to interpret or otherwise engage with his 
memories, he would indeed serve as an authorial experiment in storytelling rather than 
existing as a complex character.   
Although this claim of objectivity is commonplace in critical investigations of 
The Sound and the Fury, it contradicts another accepted interpretation of the novel; as 
Marjorie Pryse observes, there is “a kind of motivation or intention in Benjy … although 
Benjy does not possess self-awareness, his movements into the most distant past illustrate 
both the comfort and the source of original trauma that he derives from his earliest 
memories” (44).  Benjy’s memories are selective and specific; Benjy does not display 
random memories of commonplace or everyday events, but rather shows interest in and 
derives comfort from specific times, events, and people.  Stacy Burton notes in “Benjy, 
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Narrativity, and the Coherence of Compson History” (1995) that Benjy “is a character 
struggling to order and express his experience of the world.  Both what he remembers and 
what he notices reveal what matters to him: his discourse, hardly objective, strongly 
evidences his consciousness” (215).  Burton further rejects Benjy as empty or reiterative: 
“Unable to order his entire section chronologically, Benjy nonetheless patterns it 
according to his central concerns: virtually every remembered episode consists of others’ 
conversations about him or of incidents in which his sister Caddy plays a prominent 
role,” and argues that “Benjy desires to shape time, to find order in or for experiences 
whose transience he does not understand” (216).  Benjy’s memories, then, do not comfort 
him because he is unable to interpret his experiences, but rather because “he does now 
know that they represent what can never be again” (Burton 213).   
Benjy’s continual return to his memories often leads critics to claim that Benjy 
doesn’t know the difference between past and present; Pryse comments that “Benjy is not 
conscious of living in the present moment unless someone else (usually Luster) speaks to 
him” (35).  This seems an exaggerated conclusion.  Benjy is surely conscious of the 
present, although he allows his attention to wander, which is evident in the reports of 
Benjy’s cries.  When Benjy bellows or moans Luster usually reprimands him, thus 
bringing his attention back to the present.  If Benjy does not know the difference between 
past and present, he should theoretically only cry in the present if he is also crying in the 
memory he is reliving; for example, Benjy remembers being held by Caddy as she tells 
him, “You’re not a poor baby.  Are you.  Are you.  You’ve got your Caddy.  Haven’t you 
got your Caddy” (9).  He is not crying in this memory – if anything, it is a happy memory 
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– yet he is immediately recalled to the present with “Can’t you shut up that moaning and 
slobbering, Luster said.  Aint you shamed of yourself, making all this racket” (9).  It is 
clear that Benjy is crying because he is remembering a moment of intense affection for 
and from Caddy and he is able to compare this with her present absence.  Benjy cries 
because he knows that this particular moment is gone, and that Caddy has not yet 
returned, although he does not understand that she will never return.  As Hedeen states, 
“the genuine comfort of the past – being held by Caddy – is with obvious and powerful 
understatement contrasted with the much poorer comfort of the present” (630).  Benjy 
cries precisely because he can distinguish temporal difference.  To say that Benjy cannot 
discern the difference between past and present is to overlook entirely his cries, which 
serve as his main form of communication.   
Benjy’s cries also reveal a more complex interiority when he sees Miss Quentin in 
the swing (48).  He simultaneously remembers finding Caddy in the swing, and he 
momentarily mistakes Miss Quentin on some level for Caddy.  The association reminds 
him of both the original scene where Caddy is in the swing and of the fact that it is not 
Caddy there now – Caddy is gone.  Benjy begins to cry not because he thinks Miss 
Quentin is Caddy, but because he knows she is not, and he misses his sister.  Hedeen 
claims that, “Because Benjy prevents identification and association by not interpreting 
and creating, we are frustrated in our attempts to interpret and create” (630), and yet 
Benjy does both: as children, Caddy tells Quentin that she will run away.  Benjy hears 
her, understands her words, interprets their meaning and connects this to her threatened 
absence: “‘I’ll run away and never come back.’  Caddy said.  I began to cry…. ‘Hush 
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now.’  She said.  ‘I’m not going to run away.’  So I hushed.  Caddy smelled like trees in 
the rain” (19).  Benjy cries not only because he understands what Caddy is saying, but 
also out of protest.  He also calms down when she promises him she is not leaving.  Just 
because this is the only reported case of Benjy’s ability to interpret and envision the 
future, it is not a fluke or coincidence.  Benjy possesses greater intellectual ability than 
most critics credit him with.  
Benjy is also able to interpret the situation around him when Caddy’s burgeoning 
sexuality begins to change her, and her guilt separates her from Benjy: “Caddy came to 
the door and stood there, looking at Father and Mother.  Her eyes flew at me, and away.  
I began to cry.  It went loud and I got up.  Caddy came in and stood with her back to the 
wall, looking at me.  I went toward her, crying, and she shrank against the wall and I saw 
her eyes and I cried louder and pulled at her dress.  Her eyes ran” (68-69).  Here, Benjy 
responds to Caddy’s demeanor rather than her words.  Bleikasten interprets Benjy’s love 
for Caddy as “absolute only in its need and demand … Benjy does not love Caddy so 
much as Caddy’s love and in his fierce narcissism he would like this love to be given to 
nobody else” (78).  This distorts Benjy’s emotional needs in an unjustified way.  Benjy’s 
comfort relies on a routine, order, and stability that Vickery interprets as “an inflexible 
pattern which he defends against novelty or change with every bellow of his overgrown 
body” (35).  What disturbs Benjy is not Caddy paying attention to or giving love to 
someone else, but rather that by becoming sexually active and harboring the socially 
orchestrated shame that accompanies her state, she essentially becomes someone else to 
Benjy.  Caddy cannot maintain eye contact with Benjy, so he knows she is not herself.   
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Benjy demonstrates remarkable agency in this scene by pushing Caddy toward the 
bathroom, as if she can wash away her sexuality and guilt as she washed away her 
perfume (42).  Although Benjy does not understand the nature of Caddy’s emotional 
distancing from him, he knows something is wrong and responds in a way that has been 
successful in the past.  Benjy may be unable to discern Caddy’s guilt or her need for 
privacy, but he certainly has agency and knows what he wants when he pushes her 
toward the bathroom.  Even if Benjy cannot produce a sufficient solution, he has 
correctly interpreted a complex situation.   
If Benjy were only misunderstood or toyed with by those around him, his life 
experiences would not contain the agonizing tragedy that marks them.  It is both the 
immense nature and staggering volume of Benjy’s loss which builds to create true 
sympathy for Benjy.  Caddy is, of course, Benjy’s greatest source of loss.  Burton argues 
that this is because she is the greatest source of communication for Benjy: “Only Caddy 
speaks, listens, and responds to Benjy as though he has the capability to engage in verbal 
dialogue; she alone involves herself with him in a way that suggests his discourse and 
history matter” (219).  Burton also suggests that Benjy remembers Caddy so frequently 
because, “while everyone else reads him on their own narrow terms, Caddy alone 
engages him dialogically … because Caddy alone persistently offers her brother the hope 
of speech, her absence signals for Benjy the lost possibility of genuine dialogue” (218).  
Caddy is the only person around him to even try to elicit speech from Benjy, to try to 
generate complex meaning from his cries.  She is the only person to both try to develop 
his mind while simultaneously accepting it for what it is.  
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In tandem with Caddy’s efforts to communicate with Benjy is her affection for 
him, demonstrating that he is indeed a person of value.  While everyone else around him 
is concerned with quieting him and finding something to occupy his attention, she alone 
tries to capture his attention and engage it.  While others maintain the order Benjy 
appreciates so that he will stay quiet, Caddy is instead concerned for his happiness.  
Vickery notes, “Caddy both realizes and respects his fear of change … Even when she 
has accepted the inevitability of change for herself and is preparing to marry Herbert, she 
tries to bind Quentin to a promise of seeing that Benjy’s life is not further disordered by 
his being committed to a mental institution” (36).  Quentin is disinterested at best in 
Benjy’s future, and Jason simply waits for his chance to send his brother to the institution 
at Jackson.  Caddy alone understands Benjy’s particular needs and satisfies them for the 
sake of his peace, rather than her own.  
Dilsey also signals loss for Benjy, but in a very different way than Caddy does.  
Burton claims, “Dilsey and Luster interact with Benjy, but treat him as a child.… Dilsey 
usually views him as a mute three-year-old, though does so very maternally” (219).  
Dilsey does not try to teach Benjy as Caddy does, to be sure, but neither does she view 
him as an embarrassment (as Jason does), a nuisance (as Luster does), or a mysterious 
punishment (as Mrs. Compson does).  Dilsey is rather the current and only affectionate 
figure in Benjy’s life, tending to his needs and keeping him calm, even if that is the 
extent of their interaction.  It would seem as if he is just one item on her long, long list of 
things to accomplish around the Compson household if not for their trip to her church on 
Easter, as described in the final section.  To be sure, her entire family attends the service 
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so there is no one at the Compson house to watch over Benjy (except, ironically, his own 
family), so Benjy must logically accompany her, but she neither asks Luster to watch 
Benjy during the service nor resents his presence.  They share an affectionate bond that 
cannot compare to the bond Benjy has/had with Caddy, but it is made obvious that it is 
the only affectionate bond Benjy currently has.   
Thus Dilsey emphasizes not only Benjy’s staggering loss but also his isolation.  
She consistently defends Benjy in his socially marginalized status, most frequently to her 
own family.  Roskus claims the Compson family is unlucky and that Benjy is “the sign of 
it laying right there on that bed.  Aint the sign of it been here for folks to see fifteen years 
now,” to which Dilsey replies, “Spose it is … It aint hurt none of you and your, is it” 
(29).  Similarly, when Frony tells Dilsey not to let Benjy and Luster share a bed because 
“That boy conjure him,” Dilsey once more acts as the voice of reason, replying, “Hush 
your mouth … Aint you got no better sense than that” (32).  Dilsey must likewise defend 
Benjy’s humanity against the larger community when they attend Easter services at her 
church.  Frony tells her mother that she shouldn’t bring Benjy to church because people 
talk, to which Dilsey replies, “And I knows whut kind of folks … Trash white folks.  
Dat’s who it is.  Thinks he aint good enough fer white church, but nigger church aint 
good enough for him … Tell um de good Lawd dont keer whether he bright er not.  Dont 
nobody but white trash keer dat” (290).  Dilsey reliably defends Benjy, but just as her 
affection emphasizes that she is the only one to show him any, so her protection shows 
that she is the only one who is not judging him in a society full of people who are.  
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The final example of Benjy’s loss is so extreme that its employment must surely 
be, on some level, to secure sympathy for Benjy: his castration.  Most critics view this 
moment as Benjy’s first (and last) sexual act, the inevitable moment when Benjy’s 
biological development outpaces his cognitive development and chaos ensues.  Jacqui 
Griffiths, in “Almost Human: Indeterminate Children and Dogs in ‘Flush’ and The Sound 
and the Fury” (2002), asserts that, “Castration is an attempt to contain Benjy by securing 
him in a notion of pre-pubescent innocence” while it simultaneously “dehumanizes him” 
(171).  Griffiths further argues that Benjy’s castration “emphasizes the menace that 
Benjy’s sexuality presents … the discomfort associated with a creature that everybody 
insists is a child, in its dog-like caste position, but which shows evidence of ‘adult’ 
sexuality and an unrestrained animality” (171).  Thus Benjy is castrated as a way to rid 
him of his potentially uninhibited sexuality and reunite his physical development with his 
mental capacities.   
Bleikasten views Benjy’s attempts to communicate with the schoolgirls, the 
incident which ends in Benjy’s castration, as incestuous: “It is surely no accident that the 
scene of Benjy’s unique attempt at sexual intercourse occurs at the very place where he 
used to meet Caddy when she too came back from school.  Benjy once again confuses 
past and present, mistaking today’s girl with yesterday’s Caddy,” and concludes that “the 
following castration then also assumes a new symbolic significance in that it becomes the 
inescapable punishment for the violation of the primal taboo” (Failure 79).  Bliekasten 
goes on to compare this scene to the one in which Quentin is accused of sexual 
misconduct with the little girl that follows him on the day of his suicide in Boston.  
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However, as Bleikasten also notes, nothing in Benjy’s narrative “suggests a sexual 
assault.  Yet it is as such that Benjy’s behavior is construed by the girls and by the adults 
who are told about the incident.  And Faulkner’s comments leave no doubt either as to 
the sexual character of the attempted ‘communication’” (Failure 83).  I am less 
concerned with Faulkner’s comments and more concerned with Benjy’s; he repeatedly 
insists he is trying to “say,” the specificity of which must surely indicate its accuracy.  If 
he were trying to act, it does not make sense that he would report that he was trying “to 
say.”  Rather than assume this is example of Benjy’s inability to utilize language, taking 
his statement to be accurate layers the scene with ominous meaning.  If Benjy was not 
attempting to attack the girl, but rather trying to communicate with her as some sort of 
possible avatar for Caddy, then the decision to castrate him is not only an enormous 
overreaction, but a gross injustice.  As he is victimized by not being able to verbally 
defend or explain himself, here he is punished, physically and permanently, because he 
cannot explain his intentions.   
Bleikasten connects Quentin’s misunderstanding to this scene, but it is an 
appropriate connection for reasons Bleikasten surely did not anticipate.  It is not only the 
pattern of incest that unites these moments, but also the pattern of misinterpretation.  It is 
obvious that Quentin has no sexual designs on the child who follows him on the day of 
his suicide, yet her brother Julio assumes that is his intention, and even the lawmen that 
take Quentin in are ready to entertain such a possibility.  It is only after Quentin’s friends, 
who know his personality and thus can extrapolate his intentions, arrive to defend him 
that Quentin is cleared (141-145).  Benjy has no such people to vouch for his intentions 
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or even his interiority, so when his sexual inclinations are assumed, there is nothing to 
counter such a conclusion.  Quentin is freed because he (or others on his behalf) can 
verbally explain himself, while Benjy is punished because he lacks that ability.   
Benjy’s cries are a textual indicator that he is trying to communicate, but there are 
also moments when Benjy actively reports that he is trying to do something.  The fact 
that Benjy not only tries to do something, but also reports that he tries to do something, 
does not just suggest that he possesses cognitive and emotional agency – it proves it.  
Benjy’s memories of the incidents leading to his castration are the most desperate 
example of his attempts to communicate: “[The gate] was open when I touched it, and I 
held to it in the twilight.  I wasn’t crying, and I tried to stop, watching the girls coming 
along in the twilight … I opened the gate and they stopped, turning.  I was trying to say, 
and I caught her, trying to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and trying and 
the bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out” (52-53).  Roggenbuck observes that 
Benjy “tries to say and tries to cry and can do neither” (583) and responds to other critical 
interpretations of Benjy’s limited cognition in this scene by insisting that “For Benjy to 
say eight times in the span of a few sentences that he tries to accomplish something 
suggests that he possesses more than a dim sense of purpose, or a partial sense of his 
plight” (Roggenbuck 584).  Indeed, the repetition of “trying” comes to a feverish 
crescendo, where Benjy tries to order his retelling but seems to get caught up once more 
in the confused frenzy of the moment.  Benjy recounts that he tries but in the very act of 
recounting, he is also intensely trying to communicate.  Benjy is desperately trying to 
communicate the fact that he was, in that moment, trying to both communicate and act.  
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Benjy could not have known that this incident would end with his castration, but he 
knows something bad is happening to him and he is trying to get away from it.  He is 
interpreting his situation and, just like when Caddy threatens to leave or refuses to look at 
him, he tries to act accordingly.   
While this scene is life-changing for Benjy, it is not just the gravity of the 
situation that prompts him to try to do something.  In a less monumental scene, Luster 
removes flowers from Benjy’s “graveyard” and Benjy tries to get them back: “Luster 
knocked the flowers over with his hand.  ‘That’s what they’ll do to you at Jackson when 
you starts bellering.’  I tried to pick up the flowers.  Luster picked them up, and they went 
away.  I began to cry” (54-55).  This is important because it shows that Benjy’s trying is 
not limited to moments of self-preservation.  Benjy could, perhaps, try as desperately as 
he does with the schoolgirl because the moment becomes one of self-defense, in which 
case his tries could be viewed as an isolated instance of instinct.  The fact that he tries to 
regain his flowers from Luster, however, shows that when he tries to do something, it is 
an intentional act.   
Whether Benjy’s actions outside his yard are sexually motivated or not (his 
narrative discounts such a motivation but does not unequivocally refute it), the fact 
remains that his punishment is the removal of his testicles.  Whether he is a threat in his 
sexuality or simply because he cannot express himself in a traditional way, the reaction is 
severe.  Throughout his narrative he constantly asserts his humanity, and to be treated in 
such an inhumane way calls attention to his devalued place within his family and the 
larger community.  This is reasserted when Benjy cries when he sees himself in the 
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mirror, surely a response to not only his missing body parts, but also his complete lack of 
involvement in the decision (73).  The severity of the punishment is also indicated when 
Jason grossly asserts that Caddy and Miss Quentin should be castrated as well (253, 263).  
Such a statement reinforces the inhumane nature of such a punishment because Caddy 
and Miss Quentin are never viewed as inhuman in the novel.  As their humanity is never 
questioned, it is absurd that they should be subjected to such a procedure, and so it should 
also be absurd to subject Benjy to it; yet, it happens.   
Thus Benjy is often viewed as the victim in the novel.  As Bleikasten remarks, 
“even though Benjy is in many ways at one with his environment, his relationship with it 
is by no means symbiotic; and since, on the other hand, his condition prevents him from 
ever gaining any hold on it, he is bound to be the plaything of circumstance.  Benjy is the 
quintessential victim, nakedly exposed to whatever blow fate or chance aims at him” 
(Failure 72).  Benjy is also victimized when those around him are unable to interpret his 
needs; Mrs. Compson in particular refuses to understand Benjy’s cries.  Burton notes,  
Caroline Compson … is notoriously unwilling to consider the possibility 
of communicating with her son; to her he is an embarrassing object – at 
best a “poor baby,” at worst a punishment she’s certain she didn’t deserve 
(9).  Her engagement with him, both as he recalls it and as other narrators 
tell it, is strictly authoritative and monologic in intention … She rejects 
any attempts to understand Benjy: when Caddy tells her why he cries and 
how to quiet him, Caroline accuses her of “humor[ing] him too much”; 
and when T.P. explains that Benjy wants to go to the gate because he 
thinks Caddy will return, she responds, “Nonsense” (72, 59).  (218, 
original references) 
 
Although Mrs. Compson is arguably a poor mother to all her children, she essentially 
refuses to connect with Benjy at all.  This becomes more tragic considering Benjy’s 
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needs are fairly straightforward.  Most people around him, which by 1928 are more 
Dilsey’s family than his own, know how to interpret Benjy’s cries and are able to satisfy 
him at least to the extent that he stops crying.  Cheryl Lester, in “From Place to Place in 
The Sound and the Fury: The Syntax of Interrogation” (1988), notes that, “Through his 
cries, Luster understands that Benjy wants to see the golfers, the flowers, or the fire; 
Dilsey understands that Benjy smells death; Quentin understands that Benjy doesn’t want 
Caddy to leave; Caddy understands that Benjy thinks it is Christmas, that he wants to 
hold a letter, that he doesn’t like the smell of perfume, and so on” (152).  Some of 
Benjy’s companions also understand why it is he wants what he wants, as in T.P.’s astute 
observation that Benjy not only wants to go to the gate, but that he wants to go because 
he thinks Caddy will be there (51).  Therefore Benjy’s mental disability does not limit 
him as much as a lack of understanding from those around him does, and his 
victimization is largely created by his family’s increasing disinterest.   
Benjy’s victimization is only fully understood when the final section of the novel 
is considered.  The final section is essential to understanding Benjy’s plight because it is 
here that the social voice, rather than the internal voice, comes into play.  This social 
narrator is not to be mistaken with an authorial narrator; as Burton warns, “Despite 
significant differences in perspective, the fourth narrator, like the others, tells the 
Compson story quite selectively and is neither omniscient nor objective” (222).  The 
fourth narrator depicts Benjy’s physical being, rather than his interior self, as  
a big man who appeared to have been shaped of some substance whose 
particles would not or did not cohere to one another or to the frame which 
supported it.  His skin was dead looking and hairless; dropsical too, he 
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moved with a shambling gait like a trained bear.  His hair was pale and 
fine.  It had been brushed smoothly down upon his brow like that of 
children in daguerreotypes.  His eyes were clear, of the pale sweet blue of 
cornflowers, his thick mouth hung open, drooling a little.  (274) 
 
Critical reception is often one of shock; Bleikasten introduces Benjy as “the idiot, and no 
reader will fail to recognize him in this lumpish, slobbering giant.  His lack of motor 
coordination recalls his mental debility, his hairless skin and fat body indicate his 
castrated condition, and his cornflower-blue eyes are reminders of the childish innocence 
buried within this ungainly mass of adult flesh” (Melancholy 127).  Cecil is similarly put 
off by “the grossness of Faulkner’s thumbnail portrait in Section IV, the first objective 
view a reader gets of Benjy” (35).  The problem with this statement is the problem with 
any interpretation that assumes this narrator is objective – it is not.  It is a reflection, a 
culmination, of social views.  If Jefferson itself had a voice, this would be it.  It is 
imperative that Benjy be described in an insensitive way because this reveals the 
insensitive way in which Benjy’s society views him.  The complex image the reader 
forms of Benjy in no way relates to the simplistic and “gross” depiction of him in the last 
section, and this calls attention to a paradox within the text: Benjy’s depiction here does 
not capture the interiority displayed in the first section, and the failure is obvious.  Such a 
failure indicates the narrative is socially derived and emphasizes that society views Benjy 
in limited, constrained terms.   
 The description of Benjy’s eyes as blue (which was unknown information until 
the final section) is a narrative attempt to regain some of Benjy’s original self.  It is 
inadequate in that it reduces Benjy’s inner self to clear, blue eyes.  The comment that 
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Benjy watches Dilsey with a “sweet vague gaze” (275) both helps and hurts Benjy.  It 
supports the view of him as mindless – if there is nothing going on inside his head (thus 
his empty eyes) this would be reflected as vague and sweet.  It also, however, serves to 
recapture some of the original sympathy Benjy’s narrative evokes.  The physical 
depiction of Benjy causes some revulsion in the reader, but the sympathy one feels for 
Benjy directs that revulsion at the narrator for describing him in such ways, rather than at 
Benjy himself.  Benjy’s narrative proves that there is no meanness, no darkness in him 
and it is a failure on the narrator’s part for perceiving this only in his sweet blue eyes.   
 Benjy’s goodness is contrasted with Jason’s cruelty, a depiction which does not 
change even though the narrative has stepped outside Jason’s inner self.  Dilsey’s 
comment that “de good Lawd don’t keer whether [Benjy is] bright or not” (290) becomes 
rather ominous when set against the backdrop of Jason’s current rule of the Compson 
household.  The final section continues to follow Jason in his sadistic pursuit of Miss 
Quentin, and his day filled with rage and disappointment surely fuels his actions at the 
closing scene of the novel.  When Luster takes Benjy to the cemetery in the buggy but 
takes a wrong turn, Benjy’s ordered life explodes: “For an instant Ben sat in an utter 
hiatus.  Then he bellowed.  Bellow on bellow, his voice mounted, with scarce interval for 
breath.  There was more than astonishment in it, it was horror; shock; agony eyeless, 
tongueless” (320).  Jason jumps onto the buggy, corrects their direction, strikes Benjy for 
crying, and sends them on their way.  The restoration of order has calmed Benjy, who sits 
as if the previous scene never happened save that his flower has been broken by Jason’s 
hand: “The broken flower drooped over Ben’s fist and his eyes were empty and blue and 
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serene again as cornice and façade flowed smoothly once more from left to right, post 
and tree, window and doorway and signboard each in its ordered place” (321).  There is 
much to be discerned from this scene; Jason exhibits characteristic brutality when he 
strikes Luster for driving the wrong direction and hits Benjy for crying, but it is driven 
home that his rage cannot touch Benjy.  Benjy’s inner self is so much stronger than 
Jason’s wrath that even Benjy’s broken flower cannot break the serenity that he finds in 
restored order.  If Jason’s power lies in psychological warfare, then Benjy can never be 
Jason’s victim.  Such a reading deflates Jason and devalues his fury while potentially 
empowering Benjy.  The status quo that represents decay for the rest of the family is in 
fact the very thing that gives Benjy strength.  If he can keep his routines, he has the 
power to solace himself the way none of his family is able to.   
 This dependence on order comes under attack when Jason threatens to send Benjy 
to the institution at Jackson.  Jason assumes Benjy will “be happier there, with people 
like him,” (221) and that “if they’d just sent him on to Jackson while he was under the 
ether, he’d never have known the difference” (263).  What Jason’s assertions really rest 
on, however, is his shame in his brother.  He admits that  
it dont take much pride to not like to see a thirty year old man playing 
around the yard with a nigger boy, running up and down the fence and 
lowing like a cow whenever they play golf over there.  I says if they’d sent 
him to Jackson at first we’d all be better off today.  I says, you’ve done 
your duty by him; you’ve done all anybody can expect of you and more 
than most folks would do, so why not send him there and get that much 
benefit out of the taxes we pay.  (222) 
 
Benjy’s dependence on the physical reminders of Caddy around the house, such as her 
slipper, the yard, the spot on the wall where the mirror used to be, build a strong case 
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against Benjy’s happiness at Jackson.  As Caddy predicts, his world would be upended 
and the order he so heavily relies on would be unattainable.  Within the context of the 
novel, it does not matter if Benjy is actually sent to Jackson or not – it is understood that 
such a fate would devastate him.  This ultimately underscores the problematic 
relationship between Benjy and his inability to communicate with the rest of society – his 
needs are simple and finite and indeed it takes less effort to comfort him than to contain 
him.  But to the community outside his gate that sees him as a drooling lump who neither 
belongs in Dilsey’s church nor the white church, all Benjy’s “trying to say” becomes 
meaningless.  To an insensitive and unconcerned world, the emotional and beautiful 
processes that make up Benjy’s interiority become nothing – just sound and fury.   
Benjy’s narrative contains all the evidence that his mental, emotional and social 
self is in no way absent or lost.  Yet L. Moffitt Cecil’s interpretation of Benjy as a 
“blithering idiot” (34) or Bleikasten’s description of Benjy as a “lumpish, slobbering 
giant” (Melancholy 127) crassly, but reliably, echoes most critical interpretations of 
Benjy’s persona.  This seems an intensely insensitive reaction to him not only in light of 
recent disability movements, but primarily within the context of the novel itself.  The 
narrative goes to great (and I believe successful) lengths to create a genuine sympathy for 
Benjy.  As Roggenbuck summarizes, “Like his brother Quentin, Benjy’s life wears at him 
and he withdraws.  Unlike Quentin, he withdraws into his mind, to better versions of his 
life than his bleak present.  He has many good reasons for doing so.  In the course of his 
life to age thirty-three he has lost his two closest siblings, his father, important pieces of 
his territory, and his testicles” (592).  Generally, critics pick up on this sympathy to some 
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degree, usually in relation to Benjy’s emotionally unavailable family.  Jeffrey J. Folks, in 
“Crowd and Self: William Faulkner’s Sources of Agency in The Sound and the Fury” 
(2002), notes that Benjy “reflects Faulkner’s sense of disempowerment” and holds the 
position of scapegoat within the household: “His identification in that role by Dilsey 
Gibson and even by those who may not yet admit it, such as Mrs. Compson, suggests that 
he is indispensible to the continuation of the family’s order of command” (36).  With the 
position of scapegoat comes a sense of injustice, where Benjy comes to be the scapegoat 
not because he is guilty of anything but simply through his inability to fight such a 
position.   
Even Cecil acknowledges the narrative’s intended sympathy: “Having become 
convinced of [Benjy’s] innocence, his helplessness, his pitifulness, a reader becomes 
justly indignant at Jason’s contemptuous reference to Benjy as the ‘Great American 
Gelding’” (35).  Vickery combines Benjy’s and Caddy’s plights and concludes, “Benjy 
and Caddy are tests of the family’s humanity, he simply because he is not fully human … 
Benjy’s behavior is a constant trial to the family and to this extent counterpoints Caddy’s 
long disgracing act.  Both challenge the family’s capacity for understanding and 
forgiveness and the family fails both” (48).  If critics have been quick to judge Benjy, 
Benjy’s family has paved the way. 
The Hamlet 
 Benjy’s depiction is significant because Faulkner envisions the interiority of a 
person with mental disabilities and lends him voice.  Ike Snopes, in Faulkner’s The 
Hamlet (1940), is not granted the same kind of interior voice but is perhaps Faulkner’s 
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most remarkable character with mental disabilities because he is granted a brief and 
powerful journey of independence.  Ike’s depiction is the greatest example of any 
character examined here of the split between narrative representation and 
familial/communal perception.  The Hamlet revolves around the people of Frenchman’s 
Bend and the convoluted schemes that shape their lives.  Ratliff, the travelling salesman, 
journeys to and from Frenchman’s Bend and much of the narrative follows his 
observations.  The Snopes family arrives in the hamlet shrouded in mystery and rumor, 
and Flem Snopes uses this fear to climb the social ladder and start taking control of local 
commerce from the reigning Varner family and despotically granting his continually 
arriving kin positions of power in local businesses.  This sets the stage for various 
narrative twists and turns; when Varner’s youngest daughter Eula, the town beauty, is 
pregnant and unwed, Flem marries her to secure his position of power and dominance 
over the Varner family; when Mink Snopes kills Jack Houston in a fit of outrage and tries 
to run, his cousin assists in his capture because he is convinced Mink has money taken 
from Houston’s body and wants it for himself; Flem brings in an unknown horse trader to 
fool the people into buying wild and unbreakable ponies who inevitably escape after the 
money has been collected, and Flem surreptitiously profits off the people’s 
miscalculations.  
The novel is largely comprised of independent vignettes, woven together with 
themes of lust for money and the destruction of the lives that become tangled in such 
webs.  Margaret M. Dunn observes in “The Illusion of Freedom in The Hamlet and Go 
Down, Moses” (1985) that “Greed is a major motif in this contrapuntal exploration” 
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(409).  Such greed sits at the very heart of the hamlet; the decaying mansion that gives 
the hamlet its name references the Frenchman, an original settler in the area who sought 
to tame the land and even reroute the river through the work of his horde of slaves in 
order to build his palatial dwelling.  The decaying mansion also speaks to the hamlet’s 
identity: 
He was gone now, the foreigner, the Frenchman, with his family and his 
slaves and his magnificence.  His dream, his broad acres were parceled out 
now into small shiftless mortgaged farms for the directors of Jefferson 
banks to squabble over before selling finally to Will Varner, and all that 
remained of him was … the skeleton of the tremendous house which his 
heirs-at-large had been pulling down and chopping up … for thirty years 
now for firewood.  (4) 
 
The mansion was borne of greed and now the locals treat the old building as they treat 
one another, tearing it down piece by piece for their own benefit.   
 Ike is both part of and separate from the community around him, and his family 
dynamics are complex.  The Snopes clan is a mixed lot, almost none of whom are 
educated or even particularly intelligent.  When Flem Snopes opens the doors of 
Frenchman’s Bend to his family at large, Ike is one of the many Snopes who arrive 
steadily and unceremoniously, and though he has no immediate family with him, his 
cousin Flem is his guardian.  Ike is claimed by all his family in that they accept him as 
their own and make no excuses for him to the rest of the community.  They do not hide 
him away or appear hostile toward him.  This, however, is the extent of familial 
hospitality.  The Snopes clan embraces Ike as a Snopes, but no one in the family invites 
him in to truly belong, so Ike instead stays with Mrs. Littlejohn, who tends to him more 
than any of his kin do.  Ike has a small inheritance for which he is passed between family 
80 
 
 
members, and though Flem is his guardian, it is Ratliff who feels inclined to pass Mrs. 
Littlejohn some money on Ike’s behalf.  Mrs. Littlejohn takes Ike in and guides him, and 
although she is not family, she shows Ike the most compassion and patience.   
Ike’s story can be summed up fairly easily: Ike is a mentally disabled character 
who falls in love with a cow, and is forced to eat the cow when his kin discover his 
romance and are shamed by it.  But beneath the bare plot are complex layers begging to 
be explored.  Ike’s narrative is essential to the novel because Ike both represents what 
those around him lack (love, freedom, and disinterest in money) and his narrative 
emphasizes that his kin are poorer for not sharing these traits.  Ike’s story is filled with 
romantic imagery, an embracement of nature, and hope for personal fulfillment that is not 
shaped by money and these aspects are wholly opposite to the rest of the plotlines in the 
novel.   
Ike’s story stands out as a moment when the monetary schemes that so absorb his 
family and community are rendered unimportant and impotent because money changes 
hands several times in Ike’s story, yet never holds value to him.  This is most obvious 
when Houston tries to give Ike money for rescuing his cow from a barn fire, but Ike is 
only momentarily interested in the coin as an object before it “rang dully once on the 
dusty planks and perhaps glinted once, then vanished, though who to know what motion, 
infinitesimal and convulsive, of supreme repudiation there might have been” (196).  Ike 
briefly attempts to find the coin, though “watching him you would have said he did not 
want to find the coin.  And then you would have said, known, that he did not intend to 
find it” (197).  Lori Watkins Fulton notes in “He’s a Bitch: Gender and Nature in The 
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Hamlet” (2003) that “Ike’s viewpoint, while limited, remains free from the prejudices and 
preferences that influence Faulkner’s other characters” (450).  Ike’s brief encounter with 
money shows his disinterest in it, and stands in sharp contrast to the many other 
storylines that center on obtaining money, most notably Ratliff’s foolhardy quest for the 
fabled Frenchman’s treasure buried at the Old Frenchman’s Place at the end of the novel.  
Though Ike cannot comprehend the value of money the way other characters can, the cow 
holds real value for him and exposes how emotionally bankrupt other characters are. 
There are two parts to Ike’s story; the narrative recounts the people’s reactions to 
and actions toward Ike, but it also follows Ike himself and does not filter him or his 
actions through another’s perspective.  Ike’s innocence is secured by the purity of his 
narrative moment, where no outsider can color Ike or his actions with intolerance or 
ignorance.  Ike’s story is told in a peculiar way, where the reader is first subject to the 
community’s impression of Ike, then follows Ike on an independent journey, and then 
returns to Ike through the community’s perspective and leaves him there.  This 
sandwiching is the strongest technique for creating sympathy for Ike, and ideally, interest 
in him as a character.  The community’s view of Ike does not strive for understanding or 
sensitivity, and largely creates a distance between itself and Ike.  Ike’s introduction to the 
novel speaks volumes:  
Then [Ratliff] said, “What’s that?” and the other saw what he was looking 
at – the figure of a grown man but barefoot and in scant faded overalls 
which would have been about right for a fourteen-year-old boy, passing in 
the road below the gallery, dragging behind him on a string a wooden 
block with two snuff tins attached to its upper side, watching over his 
shoulder with complete absorption the dust it raised.  As he passed the 
gallery he looked up and Ratliff saw the face too – the pale eyes which 
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seemed to have no vision in them at all, the open drooling mouth encircled 
by a light fuzz of golden virgin beard.  “Another one of them,” 
Bookwright said, in that harsh short voice.  Ratliff watched the creature as 
it went on – the thick thighs about to burst from the overalls, the mowing 
head turned backward over its shoulder, watching the dragging block.  
(90-91) 
 
To the men watching him, Ike is a “that” and a “creature” who is not even described as a 
man, but rather the figure of a man.  His description is pieced together in such a way that 
he is unrelatable to the men, with his indeterminate age, and eyes and mouth lacking self-
possession.  As Fulton states, “the novel’s men doubly ‘other’ Ike; before they animalize 
him, they must first feminize him” (450).  Ike is feminized when the men stare at and 
objectify him, enumerating his physical features and which are described in terms such as 
“virgin” and “thick thighs.”  Ike is animalized even more directly when he is described as 
a “creature” with a “mowing head.”  The result of this is that Ike is “one of them” 
because he is both a Snopes and is mentally disabled, and as such cannot be “one of us.” 
The initial impression the reader receives of Ike as a “creature” (90) evokes a 
being whose disability encompasses and defines who he is and what he is capable of.  
The reader, through Ratliff, only perceives Ike’s limitations; for example, when Flem 
introduces Ike to Ratliff at the country store, Ike is incapable of freeing his stuck toy from 
the leg of a table and the effort of saying his name reduces him to frantic laughing that 
“had never been laughing, cachinnant, sobbing, already beyond the creature’s power to 
stop it, galloping headlong and dragging breath behind it like something still alive at the 
galloping heels of a Cossack holiday, the eyes above the round mouth fixed and 
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sightless” (95).  These moments appear to limit Ike’s worth as a character which makes 
his experience in the woods with the cow both more surprising and more powerful. 
While the dynamics between Ike and his family play a large role in Ike’s 
experience, the most magnificent part of Ike’s story is what happens when he is totally 
separated from his family and community.  Ike’s grand adventure does not rely on 
anyone’s assistance, and while much of the rest of the Snopes clan tends to melt together, 
to become one great, confused tangle of Snopes, Ike stands out as truly individual.  Ike is 
the only character in the novel who lives a genuine love story.  There are other stories of 
desire in the novel; the schoolteacher Labove is fixated on Eula, and the narrative uses 
language of violence and excess to describe his emotions.  Labove “was mad. He knew it. 
There would be times now when he did not even want to make love to her but wanted to 
hurt her, see blood spring and run, watch that serene face warp to the indelible mark of 
terror and agony beneath his own” (132).  Houston and his late wife are described in 
different terms that still do not connote romantic love: “It was a feud, a gage, wordless, 
uncapitulating, between that unflagging will not for love or passion but for the married 
state, and that furious and as unbending one for solitariness and freedom” (230).  The 
tone of Ike’s imaginings are wholly different, where he envisions the cow “blond among 
the purpling shadows of the pasture, not fixed amid the suppurant tender green but 
integer of spring’s concentrated climax, by it crowned, garlanded” (186).  Ike loves, and 
though the object of his affection is a cow, it is a pure love.   
Ike’s romance with the cow is both the most innocent and perverted storyline in 
the novel.  Critical views of this romance vary widely; Dunn linearly claims that “Ike 
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enjoys a brief but idyllic honeymoon alone with [the cow] … that is merely grotesque” 
(421).  In a different vein, Fulton argues that “Faulkner subtly forces readers to adopt 
Ike’s viewpoint in this section of The Hamlet, and by doing so, he transforms an act of 
bestiality into something that, while not exactly beautiful, at least becomes 
understandable.  Readers sympathize with Ike’s very real loss and mourn with him as he 
sits alone in the barn, dejected and deserted” (450).  Michael Millgate, in Writers and 
Critics: William Faulkner (1961), offers the most sensitive and intuitive interpretation of 
Ike’s narrative: 
The most important love story in the novel, however, and one which 
modifies our impression of all the others, is that of the idiot Ike Snopes, 
whose passion for Houston’s cow is celebrated at considerable length and 
in rich and elevated prose…. Here Faulkner’s “poeticizing” seems 
successful, and appropriate.  The passage is at once a stylistic tour de 
force, an extremely sensitive piece of natural description, and a deliberate 
attempt to transform an episode which Frenchman’s Bend regards as a 
simple case of crude “stock-diddling” into a magical tale of true love.  The 
whole story is an extraordinary one, and highly ambivalent in its effects.  
Because we can never forget that Ike is an idiot and the cow a cow, the 
story is in part a comic demonstration of the absurdities of romantic 
idealism; but the poetic language generates sympathy for Ike and we see in 
his complete dedication to his beloved an ironic comment on Flem’s 
complete dedication to himself.  (87-89) 
 
Millgate’s interpretation accurately views Ike’s feelings as (the only example of) love, a 
love which is very real and pure, where even the simple act of drinking water together 
displays their connectedness: “their own drinking faces break each’s mirroring, each face 
to its own shattered image wedded and annealed” (202).  This is not language of feeling 
or emotion, but something much more basic and much more powerful.  Ike cannot tell the 
cow he loves her and does not have to; the narrative clearly aligns the two in peace and 
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unity.  Löthar Honnighausen, in “Mythic Sex in Mississippi: Eula and Ike Snopes” 
(1995), observes that the “grotesque combination of the rarified with the rural, and even 
with the scatological, corresponds with the equally grotesque fact that the love of the 
mentally handicapped sodomite is the only ‘true love’ in Frenchman’s Bend” (280).  The 
point of the story is not that Ike is “handicapped,” but that the other love stories aren’t 
about love at all.  Olga Vickery further notes Ike’s empowering love in The Novels of 
William Faulkner, A Critical Interpretation (1964) when she claims that, “No extraneous 
consideration, practical, ethical, or social, distracts [Ike] from or qualifies his absorption 
in his love … he is content simply to love and to serve without demanding love in return.  
In this Ike is the perfect lover” (176).  The narrative voice supports this by engaging in 
romantic imagery, descriptions of ageless beauty and sacrifice, and does not corrupt this 
love with judgment or condemnation.   
Ike’s journey into the wilderness is both a tale of romance and of the natural 
world.  Nature is not exclusive to Ike’s narrative; the Frenchman hacks his mansion out 
of the natural world, and the people who follow live upon the land, farming out of a 
desire for preservation.  Travelers and traders journey through the wilderness and Mink 
hides out there after Houston’s murder, but Ike is the only character to embrace the 
natural world.  When Ike and his cow escape into the woods,  
they were in the hills now, among the pines.  Although the afternoon wind 
had fallen, the shaggy crests still made a constant murmuring sound in the 
high serene air.  The trunks and the massy foliage were the harps and 
strings of afternoon; the barred inconstant shadow of the day’s retrograde 
flowed steadily over them as they crossed the ridge and descended into 
shadow, into the azure bowl of evening, the windless well of night; the 
portcullis of sunset fell behind them.  (198) 
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Ike’s nature is bursting with light and sound, the supreme soundtrack to his life-defining 
experience.  This scene exemplifies the play of light and shadow and color that fills the 
narrative’s descriptions of the natural world.  Such sensory descriptions call attention to 
Ike’s disability in that he can most readily experience the world through his senses, rather 
than his cognition, and yet these scenes explode with beauty and poetry and peace and are 
arguably the most eloquent moments in the novel.  Ike cannot speak save his name, yet 
his silence allows the world around him to shine forth and break the silence with its own 
poetry that Ike alone seems to notice.  Ike is limited to, yet freed by his sensory 
connection to nature.   
It is imperative that the narrative grant such descriptive and powerful language to 
Ike’s journey because he is unable to harness language himself.  The narrative shows that 
although Ike does not command speech save his name, his story is worthy of intricate and 
eloquent language.  The description of Ike and the cow lying down to rest at the close of 
Ike’s section exemplifies this beautifully: “When he reaches her, she has already begun to 
lie down … lowering herself in two distinct stages into the spent ebb of evening, nestling 
back into the nest-form of sleep, the mammalian attar.  They lie down together” (206).  
The image is rich in its intricacy and simplicity, the final sentence uniting them 
absolutely.  Their relationship is allowed to develop in the reader’s mind as one of deep 
attachment and compassion, a remarkable account of Ike’s mental growth and 
resourcefulness.  It is only when Ike’s story is over, when the narrative returns to Ratliff’s 
perspective that Ike’s story is reduced to, in Honnighausen’s words, the “embarrassing 
case of the sodomitic relationship of an idiot with a cow” (276).  The novel’s layout is 
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key because there is no part of the narrative devoted to Ike that perverts this relationship.  
Ike’s attempts at intercourse are overshadowed by intensely detailed descriptions of how 
he is able to care for the cow and himself, and once they retreat into the wild, there is no 
mention of intercourse at all.   
The narrative voice challenges the limiting preconceptions the community places 
on Ike by infusing his experience with fluid and poetic language unmatched elsewhere in 
the novel, save Eula’s god-like descriptions that link her to an old, natural world.  
Honnighausen notes that, “In the opening passage of the episode, Faulkner, by carefully 
orchestrating acoustic and metaphoric effects, has created a nature-setting and a linguistic 
medium in which realistic features … and stylizing elements … are cautiously balanced” 
and argues the narrative language “suggests the harmony of the human being and the 
animal as integral parts of nature” (281).  The narrative indeed suggests harmony as Ike 
and the cow wander the forest, heading back to their nest for nightfall: “They walk in 
splendor.  Joined by the golden skein of the wet grass rope, they move in single file 
toward the ineffable effulgence, directly into the sun.  They are still pacing it.  They 
mount the final ridge.  They will arrive together.  At the same moment all three of them 
cross the crest and descend into the bowl of evening and are extinguished” (205).  Ike, his 
cow, and the sun are one, travelers in the natural world, moving at the same speed toward 
night.  If this glorious image is satire, then it is wasted poetry.   
In much the same way, Honnighausen argues that Ike’s story, along with Eula’s, 
should be viewed as “redemptive myths and thematic counterpoints to the stories of 
sexual anxieties projected into the Labove, Houston, and Mink Snopes plots” (276).  
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Honnighausen observes that, for Ike, “Faulkner’s principal mode of combining myth and 
reality is through the grotesque” (280), and astutely notes that, “the Ike Snopes plot, 
blending elaborate rhetoric with travesty, transmits a mythic love story.  But the story … 
of the love between a human being and an animal is not told in the acceptable style of the 
love stories of Zeus as bull or swan … Instead, Faulkner provokes readers by a diction in 
which the ‘poetic’ and Thirties’ realism are manneristically forced together” (280).  I 
would argue it is not the style in which Ike’s relationship with the cow is told but rather 
when it is filtered through the community that it becomes devalued, and thus 
unacceptable.   
The cadences in narrative style throughout the novel play a large part in shaping 
Ike’s story as a romance rather than a satire.  Lance Langdon claims that within the novel, 
“Animality is no mean station” (42), and yet the community sees it as such.  When Ike is 
perceived through the lens of the rest of the hamlet, he is the creature, the other, the “it.”  
Ratliff’s first impression of Ike is of a hulking, unfathomable figure who blurs the line 
between myth and reality (95), and when Houston confronts Ike after the fire, Ike is no 
longer “he” but is transformed into “the other” (194) and “the idiot” (208).  This image of 
Ike, however, cannot stand up to his moments of independence.  When Ike is alone with 
his cow, he is clever and learns quickly.  He halters the cow properly not out of practice 
but because he has seen it done, and knows her discomfort is due to a full milk bag (198).  
He allows the cow to eat “almost to the measured ounce exactly half of the original feed” 
(202) so that there will be enough left over to eat in the evening.  He provides water for 
them from a well he creates; he “cleaned it out and scooped a basin for it, which now at 
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each return of light stood full and clear” (202).  Even Houston notes Ike’s success at 
independence when he muses “the very virginity of the idiot at hiding had seemed to tap 
at need an inexhaustible reservoir of cleverness as one who has never before needed 
courage can seem at need to find it” (210).  Although Ike is here “the idiot,” his 
resourcefulness is compared to courage, and even disparaging labels cannot belittle his 
actions.  
Ike’s actions are more than survival instinct, however, as is seen when he gathers 
flowers to make a crown for his beloved (203).  Moreover, the narrative reveals Ike in 
new and detailed ways; in describing his eating habits, Ike grazes much as the cow does, 
“an hour later eating something else, anything else, things which the weary long record of 
shibboleth and superstition had taught his upright kind to call filth, neither liking nor 
disliking the taste of any thing … making but one discrimination: he is herbivorous, even 
the life he eats is the life of plants” (202).  This small fact infuses Ike with a gentleness, 
an innocence which predates the community around him, where man lives in harmony 
with nature.  It also layers on the tragedy of Ike being forced to eat his cow – he does not 
eat any animal, yet he is forced to eat the animal he loves.   
While with his cow in the woods, Ike “is learning fast … who has learned success 
and then precaution and secrecy and how to steal and even providence; who has only lust 
and greed and bloodthirst and a moral conscience to keep him awake at night, yet to 
acquire” (202).  Ike has learned much, but has not learned the “lust and greed and 
bloodthirst” his neighbors and kin know only too well.  Though this is a list of things Ike 
does not know, it emphasizes his innocence and elevates his personal character above 
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most of the community.  Ultimately, Ike’s story is largely viewed as a commentary on the 
rest of the novel, yet his story is much more important to the development of Ike’s 
character because it reveals his personality.  The community sees him only for his 
relationship with the cow and decides he has no worth; the narrative, however, gives Ike 
worth by showing his gentleness, determination and heroism.  The many facets that come 
together to make up Ike’s narrative reveal an interiority unacknowledged by his 
community and the ability to make complex emotional attachments unrivaled by anyone 
else in the novel.  The remarkable aspect of Ike’s story is not so much how the story 
develops the rest of the novel, but rather what his story does to develop Ike as a character.    
When Houston reclaims his cow and turns her over to Mrs. Littlejohn to be rid of 
the commotion she and Ike cause, Ike’s independent journey is over and the narrative 
returns to the community’s perspective.  He is once again the outsider who provides a 
source of morbid entertainment to the community; he is like an accident they cannot look 
away from and feel no shame in gawking at.  There are two moments when the 
community notes Ike.  The first occurs before his journey with the cow, when he climbs 
up the stairs at Mrs. Littlejohn’s and cannot navigate his way down and the locals gathers 
to witness the spectacle of Mrs. Littlejohn rescuing him: “faces gathered in the lower hall 
to watch as the firm, gentle, unremitting hand, the cold, grim, patient voice, drew him, 
clinging to the rail and bellowing, step by step downward” (188).  It is important to note 
that Mrs. Littlejohn is the only one who tries to help Ike; the others only watch him, “five 
or six people in the hall, looking up at where he clung to the rain at the top step, his eyes 
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shut, bellowing” (187).  Even in his distress, Ike does not garner sympathy from the 
larger community. 
The second moment Ike serves as a source of entertainment to the community is 
when they discover his sexual relationship with the cow and, once again, gather to watch.  
This arrangement is hinted at at the end of the first section of “The Long Summer: 
Chapter One,” but the reader, like Ratliff, does not know what the “it” is that the men are 
rushing off to see and Bookwright is so disgusted by (180-181).  Ratliff walks off to find 
out, telling a bawdy story out loud as he goes though no one is around to hear him, and 
the narrative immediately switches to Ike’s story.  It is only after Ike’s journey is over 
that the narrative returns to the peep show.  The language leading up to this moment is 
heavy with suspense.  Ratliff walks along a path “which he had not seen before, which 
had not been there in May” (216) to a secluded spot that cannot be seen from the main 
road.  Ratliff comes upon a “motionless row of backs” looking into a hole in Mrs. 
Littlejohn’s barn, and Ratliff “knew not only what he was going to see but that, like 
Bookwright, he did not want to see it, yet, unlike Bookwright, he was going to look” 
(217).  The suspense is relieved when Ratliff looks into the barn, and “it was as though it 
were himself inside the stall with the cow, himself looking out of the blasted tongueless 
face at the row of faces watching him who had been given the wordless passions but not 
the specious words” (217).  Finally, Ike and his “wordless passions” are revealed to 
Ratliff, and to the reader.  
Ratliff’s plan to kill Ike’s passions along with the cow is set into motion once he 
discovers the romance; he defends himself to Mrs. Littlejohn, saying “You dont need to 
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tell me he aint got nothing else.  I know that.  Or that I can sholy leave him have at least 
this much.  I know that too…. I aint going to leave him have what he does have simply 
because I am strong enough to keep him from it.  I am stronger than him.  Not righter.  
Not any better, maybe.  But just stronger” (219).  Ratliff knows he can force his will on 
Ike but also admits that this does not make him any better than Ike, which in turn implies 
that Ike is as much a person of worth as he is.  While Ratliff’s decision leaves Ike bereft 
and alone, it comes from a complicated place of sympathy.  Vickery sees Ratliff’s 
involvement in the decision to separate Ike from the cow as the “finest expression” of “a 
sane and balanced vision which can only be called human” (174).  However, the narrative 
in the second section of “The Long Summer: Chapter One” humanizes Ike in a way the 
people do not care to see, and their decision to slaughter Ike’s cow becomes barbaric.  
Ratliff’s conversation with the Snopes men about the cost of killing Ike’s cow becomes a 
gross intrusion in Ike’s life, rather than the moral injunction it may have seemed 
otherwise.  The men contort the relationship into a sexual perversion and concoct a 
solution where Ike eats the cow so that “not only the boy’s mind but his insides too, the 
seat of passion and sin, can have the proof that the partner of his sin is dead” (224).  What 
sounded like a cure now seems a cruel punishment that is ultimately ineffective as Ike is 
left alone with a wooden trinket. 
After the cow has been slaughtered and fed to Ike, the narrative abandons him in a 
reflection of his abandonment by the hamlet, revisiting him but once to find him a lesser 
man, presumably no longer doing work for Mrs. Littlejohn but spending his days in the 
barn with a wooden remembrance of his beloved.  Ratliff looks in on Ike, on “the blasted 
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face turning and looking up at him, and for a fading instant there was something almost 
like recognition even if there could have been no remembering, in the devastated eyes, 
and the drooling mouth slaking and emitting a sound, hoarse, abject, not loud.  Upon the 
overalled knees Ratliff saw the battered wooden effigy of a cow” (295).  Dunn interprets 
Ike’s presence in the barn incorrectly when she claims that “unlike Houston, [Ike] is able 
to forget … Ike can enjoy love’s bonds while escaping the shackles of despair at its loss” 
(422).  Ike can do nothing but remember his lost love, ruined in his socially-inflicted 
loneliness.  It is significant that the narrative does not record a scene where Ike is forced 
to eat his butchered cow for two reasons.  First, the narrative silence is in itself a 
commentary on how unfathomable Ike’s loss is.  The narrative cannot follow Ike in his 
grief because it is so profound and consuming, so much deeper than anything the rest of 
the community can conceive of, that it must be left in silence.  The narrative cannot 
follow Ike because he is made to be truly and finally alone.  
The second reason the narrative must abandon Ike before he is separated from the 
cow is to emphasize that Ike’s family and community fail to understand him.  There is a 
disconnection between Ike’s mind and the minds of those around him, and it is this 
failure of the mind that pushes the people of Frenchman’s Bend to revert to communicate 
through the body.  Ike’s mental disability prevents him from verbally communicating his 
needs, desires and motivations, and so the community around him does not understand 
how deep his emotional attachment to the cow really is.  Since Ike’s community cannot 
comprehend his relationship with the cow, they retreat from the cognitive world of 
rationalizing and understanding Ike’s behavior – his isolation, his loneliness, his 
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compassion, his resourcefulness – and enter the physical world of food and sex because 
that is the only way they can make sense of his actions; they must bridge the cognitive 
and emotional gap between themselves and Ike by creating a connection based on 
physical needs they can relate to.  It is not until the community makes a peep show out of 
Ike and his cow that the reader is confronted with the sexual nature of their bond.  That is 
not to say that the sexual context of the relationship did not exist before the men began 
their voyeurism, but rather it was not the crux of Ike’s relationship with the cow.  It was 
only made the focal point once the community ceased to view Ike as cognitive, and thus 
ceased trying to understand him on a cognitive level.   
Thus Ike is left behind, like Lucynell and Bishop, while the narrative moves on 
without him and without considering him.  Even the limited sympathy he receives from 
those involved in the slaughter of his cow is obviously insufficient when compared to the 
magnitude of his loss: Ratliff thinks enough of Ike to check in on him once and Eck 
Snopes gives Ike the wooden cow, explaining that he “felt sorry for him.  I thought 
maybe anytime he would happen to start thinking, that ere toy one would give him 
something to think about” (296).  Clearly, Ike is thinking of the cow and his desolation 
shows this.  Eck’s compassionate gift and Ratliff’s empathy, even Mrs. Littlejohn’s 
patience and humanity, are not enough to balance Ike’s loss.  Ike is left there, by both the 
town and the narrative, alone in the barn with his wooden toy cow, a “shapeless figure 
quiet in the gloom” (294).  
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Conclusion 
 The narratives of Lucynell, Bishop, Benjy and Ike place these characters in 
unsupportive and often unloving environments.  Each character is dealt hardship and 
abuse, either in the form of neglect or outright violence.  Families do not fully come to 
their rescue, society does not step in to enact change on their behalf, and at the end of 
each narrative, there is a deep and disturbing sense that these characters will indeed not 
live happily ever after (Bishop’s fate is confirmed as such even before his narrative’s 
end).  This trend is unsettling and raises the question of why there is so much neglect, so 
little love, given to characters whose actual personalities entreat those around them to 
show them more patience and dignity if not outright affection.  When the other characters 
in each narrative view, speak of, or treat the mentally disabled character negatively, it 
reveals how the world is capable of doing the same to those with mental disabilities.  
When the narratives give an alternate, positive view of that same mentally disabled 
character, it reveals how such negativity is unjust.   
For that is the power of these narratives – they contain characters whose 
personalities are contrasted with their personal tragedies to elicit sympathy from the 
reader.  Neither Faulkner nor O’Connor was ever known to be a disability activist but 
their work begins to accomplish this task, whether intentional or not.  Faulkner and 
O’Connor develop each of these characters to be more than rhetorical or narrative 
devices.  Critical discussions of these characters, even discussions that take their mental 
disability into account, sometimes fail to recognize how each character’s personality is 
presented in their stories.  Lucynell is energetic and curious; Bishop is affectionate and 
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playful; Benjy is loving and desires comfort; and Ike is adventurous and independent.  
Their cognitive abilities and limitations do not lessen their unique individualities and the 
narratives go to great lengths to establish each personality as distinct and memorable.  To 
view these characters as symbolic or rhetorical diminishes their worth within their stories 
and in the larger arena of human experience.   
Olga Vickery observes that Benjy’s humanity is forgotten when he attends Easter 
services with Dilsey, but it is not just his community that is guilty of this – critical 
treatment of Benjy, as well as Lucynell, Bishop, and Ike, overlooks their essential 
humanity.  This dismisses carefully constructed narratives where each character is fleshed 
out with at least some measure of compassion and consideration, and it is perhaps most 
assuredly through each character’s mistreatment (both within their narratives and 
without) that the reader comes to feel for them in a way they might not otherwise.  
Perhaps the feeling is indignation, perhaps love, but either way it is the seed of change. 
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